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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Constance S. Chandler 
Master of Science 
School of Journalism and Communication 
March 2014 
Title: Exploring the Relevance of Relationship Management Theory to Investor Relations 
 
This study examines the relevance of an established public relations theory, 
relationship management, to investor relations. Having emerged during the 1950s, 
investor relations is a relatively new field that integrates the disciplines of 
communication, marketing, finance, and securities laws compliance. Through qualitative 
interviews focused on six publicly traded companies on the West Coast, the study 
provides insight into the relationship management function of investor relations from the 
perspectives of those whom investors ultimately hold accountable for a public company’s 
performance – CEOs. The dominant theme emerging from the study is the constant 
challenge CEOs of public companies face as they engage in relationships with investors, 
primarily due to the constraining effects of regulatory requirements. While the study 
confirmed that the interviewees value L. C. Hon and J. E. Grunig’s qualities of trust, 
satisfaction, control mutuality and commitment in relationships with investors, CEOs’ 
most frequently discussed relationship quality that they work to achieve is trust. 
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 CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Investor relations, which integrates the disciplines of communication, marketing, 
finance, and compliance with securities laws (NIRI, 2013), is a relatively new field that 
emerged during the 1950s as the United States embarked on a 20-year economic 
expansion. As the volume of shares trading in the stock market rose dramatically, 
stockholders became another public with whom publicly traded companies needed to 
communicate. As owners of the publicly traded shares of a corporation, stockholders 
have the right to vote on certain issues, including, for example, the right to participate in 
the election of the members of the board of directors (Thomsett, 1986). 
Today, investor relations is recognized as essential to the ability of a public 
company to compete for capital and to achieve and maintain a fair valuation for the 
company’s securities over the longer-term. Some have argued that a proactive and well-
executed investor relations program can contribute 10% to a company’s stock price 
(Hobor, 2012).  
In contrast, failure to engage successfully with investors can create significant 
downward pressure on a company’s stock and also severely limit management’s ability to 
complete major strategic and financial transactions. For example, Apple Inc. stockholders 
drove the company’s stock price down 30% in just five months in 2012 over concerns 
about increased competition, the compensation level of its senior executives, and the 
company’s reluctance to distribute some of its nearly $137 billion in cash to its 
stockholders. Speaking at the company’s annual meeting of stockholders in February 
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2013, Apple’s CEO Tim Cook acknowledged dissatisfaction with the dramatic loss of the 
stock’s value but seemed to minimize his stockholders’ concerns – even appearing to be 
dismissive of those concerns. When questioned about the issue, he responded: “I don’t 
like it either. Nor does the board or the management team … but we’re focused on the 
long term” (Moore & Treanor, 2013). And Dell Inc.’s largest outside investors withheld 
for six months their support for a buyout offer in 2013 from founder Michael Dell and 
private investors, claiming that the price being offered to shareholders for their shares 
was too low (Terlep, Worthen, & Demos, 2013). Ultimately, following an extended battle 
with shareholders, including numerous delays in the vote due to lack of sufficient 
shareholder support, Dell completed the buyout, but only after increasing the initial 
$13.65 share price to $13.75 as well as agreeing to pay shareholders two special 
dividends. So, in addition to the increased transaction expenses and the loss of business 
opportunities from the delay in completing the buyout, the price tag for Michael Dell to 
take the company private rose $6.0 billion to $25.0 billion (Benoit, 2013; Rubin & 
Benoit, 2013) 
To the extent that CEOs such as Apple’s Tim Cook and Michael Dell engage with 
investors in a way that fails to genuinely acknowledge investors’ concerns, these 
executives risk compromising their relationships with investors as key stakeholders. 
Given that intangibles, including how management is perceived by investors, can 
comprise more than 50% of the criteria for investment decisions (Laskin, 2011), 
underestimating the importance of a relationship with investors characterized by a 
demonstrated mutual respect and a commitment to two-way communication that seeks to 
achieve an organization’s interests while at the same time trying to accommodate its 
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stakeholders interests can jeopardize a public company’s appeal to investors and, 
ultimately, its ability to achieve a fair valuation. Such negative outcomes suggest that 
building and maintaining relationships is as integral to the discipline of investor relations 
as scholarly studies have argued it is to public relations. 
The Evolution of Investor Relations 
Two major economic and social turning points of the 1950s contributed to the 
emergence of investor relations. The dramatic economic expansion that began after 
World War II and continued until the early 1970s increased the wealth of private citizens 
in Western countries, including the United States. These increasingly affluent individuals 
sought opportunities to invest their surplus income. Simultaneously, companies across 
America, particularly consumer product companies, were in need of greater financial 
resources to fund their expanding operations aimed at capturing customers in the newly 
invigorated consumer marketplace. These companies turned to the stock market to find 
investors who had the financial resources to become shareholders of their publicly traded 
stock.  
To communicate with and attract investors to their stock, public companies in the 
1950s and 1960s looked to the public relations field, which at the time was focused 
primarily on generating publicity for organizations and individuals. Consequently, early 
investor relations efforts relied heavily on promotional tactics to woo investors. These 
tactics, including “dog and pony shows” (Mahoney, 1991, p. 3) and lavish events, were 
aimed at impressing investors and selling them on the idea of becoming stockholders. 
Investors, however, wanted access to information and to opportunities to engage in 
ongoing discussions with senior management about strategic direction, operational 
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performance, financial results, and opportunities in the marketplace for the products and 
services of the companies in which they had become stockholders. Glossy annual reports 
and fancy gift boxes were not enough to satisfy these individual investors who had risked 
their own money to become stockholders. As investors, they took their ownership in 
public companies seriously and expected the executive teams managing public companies 
to take them seriously as shareholders (Laskin, 2010).  
Even though investor relations was initially influenced by public relations, the 
financial nature of much of the information provided to stockholders began to define 
investor relations as a professional experience similar to public relations but also different 
from it in significant ways. For example, investor relations professionals must 
communicate information consistent with stock exchange listing requirements and the 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal agency that 
administers the securities laws in the United States. Generally, these laws prohibit false 
representations and disclosures made in connection with the buying and selling of 
publicly traded securities (Pedersen, 2009). This highly regulated environment is unlike 
the setting in which most public relations professionals work.  
Another key development in the evolution of investor relations was the 
institutionalization of the equities markets in the United States. As the number of assets 
and the volume of shares trading in the stock market steadily increased throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, a structural change was made to streamline the financial markets and to 
make them more efficient. Professional money managers began to pool the money of 
individual investors and to collectively manage these assets in a variety of institutional 
funds. Given the significant number of shares that any institutional fund might own in a 
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public company on behalf of a large group of individual investors, the portfolio managers 
of these funds had more influence with public companies than any one individual 
investor – their decision to buy or sell shares in a company could have an immediate 
impact on that company’s stock price (Laskin, 2010).  
Combined with the fact that these portfolio managers had significant expertise in 
financial matters and diverse opportunities for investing, it became critical for investor 
relations professionals to develop expertise and fluency in the financial models and 
business transactions of public companies as well as to demonstrate a working 
understanding of capital markets and investment strategies (Laskin, 2010). In addition, 
investor relations professionals had to be knowledgeable about a range of regulatory 
guidelines, including the SEC’s requirements related to the disclosure of any information 
to the public defined as “material,” which generally means any information that is 
reasonably likely to influence investors’ buy or sell decisions or to have a significant 
impact on the market price of a publicly traded stock. While a company’s legal counsel 
and finance department are primarily responsible for compliance with regulatory 
requirements related to a company’s official filings with the SEC and the stock 
exchanges, investor relations professionals work with senior management to formulate 
the company’s disclosure policy and ensure that the day-to-day communications with the 
investment community are consistent with this disclosure policy and regulatory 
requirements.  
For the reasons discussed above, investor relations is a uniquely situated function 
in the organizational structure of public companies and one that continues to evolve. 
While it was conceived initially as a public relations function at a time when public 
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relations was still characterized by promotional tactics aimed at generating publicity, it is 
now being practiced by professionals with expertise in finance, communication, and 
securities law compliance who are increasingly focused on building strong relationships 
with investors using two-way communication aimed at achieving a balance between the 
interests of the company and the interests of its stakeholders. Such an approach may 
result in either or both the organization and its stakeholders changing their behavior.  
Recognizing the importance of two-way communication to investor relations, in 
2003 the board of directors of the National Investor Relations Institute, which was 
established in 1969 and is the leading professional organization for investor relations, 
adopted the following definition of investor relations to emphasize the importance of 
investor relations in facilitating two-way communication between companies and the 
investment community: 
Investor relations is a strategic management responsibility that integrates finance, 
communication, marketing and securities law compliance to enable the most 
effective two-way communication between a company, the financial community, 
and other constituencies, which ultimately contributes to a company’s achieving 
fair valuation. (NIRI, 2103, About Us section, para. 2)  
 
Similarly, an Ernst & Young global executive interviewed by Hutchins (2008) observed 
that the role of investor relations professionals goes beyond providing information to the 
investment community. According to the executive, investor relations officers also 
establish the dialogue between a company and the investment community, which 
facilitates the building and maintaining of relationships between senior executives of 
public companies and their investors (Hutchins, 2008).  
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Investor Relations and Public Relations 
Many of the communication activities that investor relations professionals are 
engaged in on a day-to-day basis are similar to those of public relations professionals, 
such as formulating news releases, serving as media liaisons, developing fact sheets and 
other information for electronic or print distribution, writing management speeches, and 
creating presentations. But important differences also exist between the two fields that 
relate primarily to (1) the content of the messages, (2) the key audience for these 
messages, and (3) the regulatory guidelines that mandate how this information is 
communicated, or disclosed, to that audience.  
For the most part, the focus of the content that investor relations professionals 
develop is related to the strategic, operational, and financial performance of companies. 
The investment community, which generally is defined as the portfolio managers at large 
institutional funds such as Fidelity Investments and T. Rowe Price, sell-side analysts who 
recommend stocks to institutional and individual investors, individual investors, and 
retail stockbrokers who sell stocks to individual investors, is the key audience to which 
this information is directed. The process by which information is communicated to the 
investment community is driven by legal parameters established by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the stock exchanges. For the most part, the intent of these 
regulatory agencies is to maintain a level playing field among investors by ensuring that 
all investors have equal access to accurate information about publicly traded companies. 
Investor relations professionals develop extensive expertise in managing the disclosure of 
this information consistent with these legal requirements, whether the information is 
8 
 
shared in one-on-one meetings, in investor teleconferences and webcasts, or at Wall 
Street hosted conferences. 
Generally, investor relations is not offered as a course of study in U.S. colleges 
and universities or in academic institutions overseas. However, the National Investor 
Relations Institute has developed a substantial body of knowledge in investor relations 
over the past four decades. NIRI educational seminars are offered each year to develop 
and improve the professional expertise of investor relations practitioners both in the 
United States and internationally. These professional development seminars focus 
significant attention on the most effective ways to share information with the investment 
community to close the information gap (Mahoney, 1991) that exists naturally between a 
company and its investors. Therefore, discussion topics at educational seminars primarily 
focus on best practices and strategies for managing the production and dissemination of 
information related to corporate strategies and financial performance. Investor relations 
activities and communication vehicles such as investor relations sections of a company’s 
website, teleconferences and webcasts with the investment community, one-on-one 
meetings with current and potential investors both in the United States and 
internationally, and senior management presentations at investor conferences are 
examples of the primary topics of professional seminars. Tactics for targeting potential 
new investors, utilizing digital media, and adapting disclosures practices to accommodate 
the evolving regulatory environment also are routinely addressed. 
 Even though public relations scholars consider investor relations to be a 
specialized field of public relations, academic researchers have largely neglected investor 
relations, except for a few noteworthy studies (Laskin, 2011). This neglect is despite the 
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substantial progress that public relations scholars have made in the past several decades 
in the development of theory specific to public relations, such as relationship 
management, which holds that the purpose of public relations is to manage the 
relationships between an organization and its publics (Ledingham & Brunig, 2000). Until 
now, the relevance of this theoretical framework has not been applied to investor 
relations, despite the specialized role of investor relations in managing relations with the 
investment community.  
Building on scholarly research in the field of public relations, this current study 
responds to suggestions for academic research that explores the relevance of relationship 
management theory to investor relations. The study examines whether CEOs perceive 
investor relations as the management of relationships between a public company and its 
investors. The study also seeks to determine how relationship management theory might 
inform investor relations practices, particularly through the perspectives of those who 
manage companies and who are a company’s public face – the CEOs (Garten, 2001).  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
This literature review focuses on studies of public relations from the relationship 
management perspective as well as research in investor relations conducted more recently 
by public relations and business scholars. Using a relationship management approach to 
investor relations applies an established public relations theoretical framework to the 
investigation and understanding of relationships between public companies and a key 
stakeholder group, the investment community. 
Public Relations from the Relationship Management Perspective 
Relationship management in the field of public relations implies mutually 
advantageous relationships between organizations and their key publics that are 
developed, maintained, and expanded over time. Scholars across multiple disciplines 
agree that relationships – whether interpersonal or professional – are characterized by a 
set of expectations two parties have of one another’s behavior that are derived from the 
nature of the parties’ connection.  
The first scholar to articulate a strong rationale for developing a public relations 
theory focused on relationships was Ferguson (1984). She made the case that by 
emphasizing relationships instead of the organization, the organization’s publics, or the 
communication process, it would be possible to study the significance of these 
relationships. Researchers could then gain insight about the various attributes of the 
relationships between an organization and its publics and also measure the impact of 
these relationships on attitudes and behavior toward an organization.  
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By focusing on relationship as the unit of analysis, some public relations scholars 
argue that the contribution of public relations is not solely related to strategic planning 
and implementation of communication aimed at influencing, informing, and obtaining 
feedback from key stakeholders. While managing the development of communication 
strategies and implementing outputs are integral to public relations, relationship 
management theory holds that the essence of public relations is building mutually 
beneficial relationships with the publics that can enhance or hinder an organization’s 
opportunities to achieve its goals (Ledingham & Bruning, 2000). 
Given that the contribution of public relations as a profession is either 
underestimated or misunderstood by most senior executives (Ledingham & Bruning, 
2000), many scholars and practitioners believe that developing a means for measuring 
and monitoring public relations, such as relationship management theory does, is 
critically important.  
In the years since Ferguson (1984) first suggested that relationships were the most 
relevant focus of research in public relations, academic studies focused on the 
understanding of organization-public relationships have increased substantially. Broom, 
Casey, and Ritchey (1997) examined the concept of relationship to identify meaningful 
properties of relationships to be measured. They reviewed the literature in the fields of 
interpersonal communication, psychotherapy, interorganizational relationships, and 
systems theory, in which relationship is a key concept. Because of the wide range of 
definitions of the concept of relationship across these disciplines, the researchers 
concluded it would be difficult for public relations scholars to advance a relationship-
centric theory of public relations until the concept of relationship was more clearly 
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defined. Ledingham and Brunig (1998) responded by positing a definition of the 
organization-public relationship as “the state which exists between an organization and 
its key publics, in which the actions of either can impact the economic, social, cultural or 
political well being of the other” (p. 62). 
As relationship management theory gained acceptance among many public 
relations scholars as a theory specific to public relations (Ledingham & Brunig, 2000), 
some suggested that these relationships could be effectively managed through 
communication alone. J. E. Grunig (1993), however, held that organization-public 
relationships are both symbolic and behavioral. He argued: 
When symbolic (communication-based) relationships are divorced from 
behavioral (grounded in actions and events) relationships, public relations 
practitioners reduce public relations to the simplistic notion of image building 
which offers little of value to the organizations they advise because they 
suggest that problems in relationships with publics can be solved by using the 
proper message – disseminated through publicity or media relations – to 
change an image of an organization. (p. 136) 
 
This understanding of the nature of organization-public relationships is also 
apparent in public relations research (Grunig, J. E. & Grunig, L. A. 1992) that argues that 
the two-way symmetrical model, which uses communication to negotiate mutual 
agreements with publics, to settle conflicts, and to build mutual understanding and 
respect between an organization and its publics, provides the greatest value to an 
organization’s effectiveness when compared to the other three models. These other 
models include the press agentry model, the public information model, and the two-way 
asymmetrical model of public relations (Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, 1984).  
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The press agentry model, which dominated public relations practice in the early 
and mid-20th century, is aimed at gaining favorable publicity through the mass media. 
The goal of this one-way communication model is to make an organization or individual 
look good and worthy of respect, even if that is not the reality. The public information 
model is also a one-way model. It is focused on developing and distributing information 
that is relatively objective, although typically favorable to the organization. The two-way 
asymmetrical model makes use of research to develop persuasive messages that are most 
likely to convince key stakeholders to form an attitude and take action consistent with an 
organization’s goals and objectives. Unlike the two-way symmetrical model, this model 
does not make use of research to discover how an organization’s publics feel and think 
about the issues and the organization, and it suggests minimal interest in achieving goals 
that mutually benefit the public as well as the organization (Grunig, J. E. 1992).  
Since J. E. Grunig and Hunt (1984) initially conceived the four models of public 
relations, scholars have advanced a “mixed-motive model” that includes both the two-
way symmetrical and two-way asymmetrical models (Dozier, Grunig, L. A., & Grunig, J. 
E., 1995): 
In the model, organizations and publics are viewed as holding separate and 
sometimes conflicting interests. Nevertheless, negotiation and compromise permit 
organizations and publics to find a common ground, the win-win zone … The 
model suggests that a number of outcomes are possible within the win-win zone. 
Unsatisfactory and unstable relationships exist on either side of the win-win zone, 
with one party exploiting the other. (p. 48)  
 
Similarly, Hon and Grunig (1999) argue that organizations tend to make better 
decisions when they are willing to listen and engage collaboratively with key publics 
prior to making final decisions instead of using communication tactics to persuade 
publics to support the organization’s decisions after they already have been made. In 
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2012, consistent with the changing emphasis in the purpose of public relations, the Public 
Relations Society of America (PRSA) adopted a definition derived from a crowdsourcing 
campaign that describes public relations as “a strategic communication process that 
builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics” (PRSA, 
2014, About Us section, para. 2). 
To further advance the understanding of how to manage organization-public 
relationships, Hon and J. E. Grunig (1999) suggested the following as critical to 
maintaining organization-public relationships: 
 access – parties to the relationship have access to each other’s decision making 
processes; the parties respond to communication from each other and the parties 
are willing to communicate directly to the other parties when they have 
complaints or questions instead of taking unsatisfactory experiences and 
unanswered questions to a third party. 
 positiveness – parties to the relationship engage in activities that make the 
relationship more enjoyable for the other parties involved.  
 openness – parties to the relationship are willing to be open about thoughts and 
feelings. 
 assurance – parties to the relationship make the effort to assure the other parties 
that they and their concerns are legitimate while also making the effort to 
demonstrate a commitment to the relationship. 
  networking – organizations build networks and alliances with the same groups  
with which their publics have alliances.  
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  sharing of tasks – organizations and publics work together to address mutual or 
separate problems. 
Hon and J. E. Grunig (1999) also posited the following four measureable predictors 
of the quality of successful organization-public relationships:  
 control mutuality – the extent to which parties agree to the rightful power to 
influence one another. Enduring positive relationships between organizations and 
publics need to be characterized by some degree of control over the other, even 
though some degree of power imbalance is natural in organization-public 
relationships. 
 trust – one party’s level of confidence in and willingness to be open to the other 
party. Underlying dimensions of trust are integrity (the belief that an organization 
is fair and just), dependability (the belief that the organization will do what it says 
it will do), and competence (the belief that an organization has the ability to do 
what it says it will do). 
 satisfaction – the degree to which one party feels favorably toward the other as a 
result of positive expectations about the relationship being met. Also, in a 
satisfying relationship, the benefits outweigh the costs. Satisfaction also results 
when one party believes the other party is making a sincere effort to maintain the 
relationship. 
 commitment – the extent to which the parties in the relationship believe and feel 
that it is important to invest energy in  maintaining and developing the 
relationship. 
16 
 
Hon and J. E. Grunig (1999) reviewed literature in interpersonal communication and 
psychology to develop scales for measuring control mutuality, trust, satisfaction, and 
commitment as indicators of a successful organization-public relationship. They tested 
these scales in a pilot study with five organizations selected as representative of different 
types of public and private organizations. These scales provide the basis for the guided 
interviews in the current study (Hon & Grunig, J. E., 1999). While all four scales are 
considered integral to measuring the quality of relationships between organizations and 
their key stakeholders, trust has emerged as particularly relevant, given the crises 
throughout financial institutions, public companies, and the economy, in general, during 
the past decade. 
Rebuilding Trust after the Financial Failures of the 2000s 
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, researchers focused renewed 
attention on the role of trust in organization-public relationships. Shockley-Zalabak and 
Morreale (2011) argued that “trust is the main thing in any organization” (p. 44). They 
concluded from their review of research that a high-level of organizational trust has been 
associated with (1) more adaptive organizational structures, (2) opportunities to enter into 
strategic alliances, (3) effective crisis management, (4) lower litigation costs, (5) reduced 
transaction costs, (6) product innovation, and (7) financial performance. 
Rawlins (2007) observed that trust is necessary in the practice of public relations 
on two levels. First, credibility is essential to public relations professionals’ ability to be 
effective messengers for organizations. Second, trust is fundamental to the development 
of relationships with key stakeholders and to the ability to sustain these relationships. He 
posited the following definition of trust: “Trust is one party’s willingness – shown by 
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intention and behavior – to be vulnerable to another party based on confidence developed 
cognitively and affectively that the latter party is: (a) benevolent, (b) reliable, (c) 
competent, (d) honest, and (e) open” (p. 5). 
Lev (2012) argues that investors’ increasing hostility toward public companies 
during the past decade and the widespread perception that corporate executives are 
untrustworthy are the unmistakable outcomes of the egregious business practices of such 
public companies as Enron and WorldCom as well as the pervasive financial losses in the 
residential and commercial real estate markets triggered by the downfall of Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers and Countrywide Financial. He posits that rebuilding investors’ and the 
public trust is the most serious challenge confronting the senior executives of today’s 
public companies. By 2014, businesses, in general, had begun to regain some of the trust 
lost during 2008 and 2009, due partly to a commitment to increased transparency 
(Edelman, 2014).  
The role of investor relations professionals in leading communication between the 
investment community and public companies as these companies and their senior 
executives engage in relationships with investors creates a significant opportunity – and 
responsibility – for investor relations officers to ensure that a genuine commitment to 
trust is the cornerstone of these relationships. Considering the substantial and growing 
influence of investors as a key stakeholder group, academic research to advance scholarly 
knowledge related to the field of investor relations is needed. 
Investor Relations Literature 
Although investor relations has received only limited attention among public 
relations scholars, several studies relevant to this research have emerged that examine the 
18 
 
practice of investor relations. Among the findings of these studies is an emerging view 
that two-way communication and relationship building are fundamental to effective 
investor relations. 
Of particular significance is the Kelly, Laskin, and Rosenstein (2010) national 
study of 145 professionals, including members of NIRI as well as members of the Public 
Relations Society of America (PRSA). According to the study, public relations 
practitioners and organizations, in general, predominately practice press agentry public 
relations, while investor relations officers and the publicly traded companies they work 
for predominately practice two-way symmetrical communication with the investment 
community. It is noteworthy that investor relations professionals are practicing the 
normative model more frequently than public relations professionals do. The major 
impact that investors have on a public company’s ability to survive as a business and to 
be successful in both the near and longer term may provide the rationale and motivation 
for investor relations practitioners to more fully embrace the two-way symmetrical model 
than their colleagues in public relations (L. A. Grunig, 1992). 
Laskin (2011) surveyed investor relations officers from both public companies 
and agencies to examine their perceptions of the contribution investor relations makes to 
public companies. Among the indicators of value included in the study was “relationship 
building” (p. 316). Participants indicated that establishing personal relationships with the 
investment community is critical and makes it possible to build credibility among such 
key investment community audiences as buy and sell-side analysts, portfolio managers of 
large institutional funds, and credit rating agencies. Engaging in proactive, transparent, 
and trustworthy communication resulted in greater patience among investors and a 
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willingness to remain shareholders when the companies in which they held stock 
experienced the inevitable setbacks and disappointments. Nevertheless, respondents 
cautioned that recurring failure to meet expectations for performance would undermine, 
ultimately, any company’s ability to maintain strong relationships with investors. The 
respondents also referenced surveys of the buy and sell-side community that suggest 
intangibles comprise more than 50% of the criteria used today for making investments. 
Among the most important of these intangibles was the reputation of management 
(Laskin, 2011).  
Petersen and Martin (1996) asked chief executive officers (CEOs) in nonbanking 
public companies in Florida if they perceived investor relations as a specialty of the 
public relations discipline. The study found that the CEOs sampled viewed investor 
relations more as a financial function than a public relations function. These CEOs also 
indicated that investor relations was a function that required the direct involvement of 
senior management, in particular the CEO and the CFO. Consequently, only 13% of the 
CEOs indicated that the chief public relations officer was involved in overseeing the 
investor relations function (Petersen & Martin, 1996). 
Petersen and Martin (1996) also found that the investor relations activity rated 
most highly by CEOs was the interaction of investor relations with senior management. 
Engaging with industry leaders and attracting the attention and support of well-respected 
analysts also were ranked as priority investor relations activities. These CEOs believed 
that “earning a reputation for honesty” (p. 193) was the most important outcome of 
investor relations activities. Among other program outcomes identified as critical by 
these executives were (1) providing ongoing information to investors, (2) appropriate 
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disclosure of information based on regulatory requirements, (3) attracting new investors, 
(4) developing good relationships with the analysts covering the company as well as 
increasing analyst coverage, and (5) effective communication with the public. Although 
the results of this study, which focused on 76 responses received from nonbanking public 
companies in Florida, could not be generalized to the broad population of CEOs, the 
findings provided important insights into how these CEOs perceived investor relations to 
be different from public relations and the role they believed investor relations had in their 
organizations. 
Business scholars also have examined the field of investor relations with studies 
that focus on a range of issues. Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
are among the topics addressed by these scholars that are of relevance to this study. These 
studies respond to the growing interest in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) among 
mainstream investors as well as socially responsible investors (Fieseler, 2011). As 
investors’ interest in environmental, social, and governance issues expands, the 
importance of communicating about these issues has become increasingly important to 
investor relations professionals.  
Hockerts and Moir (2004) conducted some of the early research examining how 
investor relations practitioners address the need to communicate about corporate social 
responsibility issues to investors. With a focus primarily on multinationals with 
headquarters in Europe, they investigated how investor relations practitioners perceive 
CSR, the role they had in communicating about CSR issues, and their view of the future 
impact of CSR. Overall, the researchers found that companies have an increased 
awareness of the need to improve the disclosure of information related to social and 
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environmental performance. And while these investor relations professionals believed 
investors and analysts will continue to expand their use of social and environmental 
criteria as they make investment decisions, this is expected to occur only gradually. 
Nevertheless, participants indicated companies can expect investors to be increasingly 
concerned with how companies are managing their environmental and social impact in 
addition to revenues and earnings performance. The researchers argue that investor 
relations professionals will need to engage in more two-way communication as they take 
a more active role in providing feedback to management about the investment 
community’s concerns related to CSR issues (Hockerts & Moir, 2004). 
For the purpose of advancing understanding within the investor relations field of 
how to improve communication with investors related to CSR issues, Fiesler (2011) 
examined how equity analysts in the capital markets in Germany view CSR. In 
comparison to earlier studies, Fieseler (2011, p. 132) focused on “mainstream business 
case equity analysts, who presumably concentrate exclusively on financial data (as 
opposed to socially responsible investors).”  The study found that equity analysts view 
CSR issues, for the most part, from an economic perspective, particularly the contribution 
they make to creating shareholder value. However, this financial orientation does not 
suggest that a company’s concerns for profits can exclude taking into consideration the 
concerns of all publics who have a stake in the organization, because under certain 
circumstances addressing these concerns can increase shareholder value. In addition, the 
equity analysts interviewed for the study indicated that building a relationship between 
the company and the investment company based on trust was a major responsibility of 
public companies. They stated that a strong commitment to an ongoing exchange of 
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information with the investment community is essential to establishing this trust with 
investors and to building a reputation of reliability (Fieseler, 2011). 
Trust also was examined by Ryan and Bucholtz (2011), who argued that 
becoming a stockholder requires “both financial and ethical risk, which by definition 
requires some level of implicit trust in management and the market” (p. 177). The 
researchers present a Trust/Risk Model of Shareholder Behavior to illustrate how 
individual investors, who in 2001 owned approximately 50% of the equity in U.S. 
companies, made investment decisions. They posit that a key component of the decision 
making process engaged in by individual investors includes not only financial 
performance and the macroeconomic environment but also senior management’s 
awareness of its moral duty. Part of the reason investors pay attention to a company’s 
ethical behavior is based on the realization that news coverage of unethical activities can 
negatively impact a company’s stock for a substantial length of time (Ryan & Bucholtz, 
2011). 
To date, scholars researching investor relations have not examined the field from 
the perspective and experiences of CEOs, except for the Petersen and Martin (1996) 
study that focused on CEO perceptions of investor relations as a public relations function. 
This is despite the fact that as leaders of public companies, CEOs have a major 
responsibility to engage in complex relationships with their investors and communicate in 
a variety of critical circumstances with these key stakeholders who can provide support 
for or limit a company’s opportunities to achieve its goals. According to a 1994 survey of 
220 companies in the United States with revenues of more than $1 billion, 46% of the 
CEOs of these companies spent more than 40 hours annually engaged with their large 
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investors (The Conference Board, 1994). As investors rely increasingly on such 
intangibles as “integrity, vision and leadership” (Charlier, 2013, p. 7), in addition to 
financial performance to make investment decisions, the need for CEOs to be engaged 
with their investors has become even more critical to a company’s long-term success. 
Today, CEOs in major public companies are estimated to spend on average 25% of their 
time dealing with the financial community (Scott, 2005). A study that examines how 
CEOs as leaders of public companies engage with investors and their perceptions of their 
relationships with their large institutional stockholders is needed to further advance the 
understanding of investor relations. 
Based on the literature reviewed in relationship management theory and scholarly 
research in investor relations, the following research questions were posed for this study: 
R1: How do CEOs define best practice in investor relations? 
 To what extent do CEOs rely on two-way communication as they engage 
with their major investors?  
 What do CEOs believe are the most important outcomes of an investor 
relations program? 
R2: What qualities do CEOs of public companies value in their relationships with 
their large institutional investors?  
 Do CEOs of public companies work to achieve trust, commitment, 
satisfaction, and control mutuality in their relationships with this key 
public? 
R3: How do CEOs characterize the relationship between investor relations and 
public relations? 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Because this study investigates the relevance of relationship management theory 
to investor relations, the research design consists of interviews and employs the analytic 
induction approach that emerged from the Chicago School of sociology in the 1930s and 
1940s (Vidich & Lyman, 1994). The study examines the theory of relationship 
management, an established public relations theoretical framework that measures the 
quality of organization-public relationships based on the dimensions of trust, control 
mutuality, commitment, and satisfaction, to determine whether the theory can be applied 
to the investigation of the quality of organization-public relationships in the investor 
relations field, in particular the relationships between CEOs and their largest 
stockholders. 
Sample 
Participants were selected using purposeful sampling from publicly available lists 
of the largest public companies in Oregon, Washington, and California based on total 
annual revenue. Participants listed below in Table 3.1 were CEOs across a range of 
industries, including financial services and banking, medical devices, and technology. 
The 2012 annual revenue of the companies participating in the study ranged from 
approximately $60 million to nearly $2 billion, and the market capitalizations of the 
companies (calculated by multiplying share price by shares outstanding) ranged from 
approximately $270 million to nearly $7.0 billion at the time of this writing.  
 
25 
 
 
Table 3.1: Participant Information and Pseudonyms 
Name 2012 Fiscal 
Year 
Revenue 
Market 
Capitalization(as 
of 12-17-2013) 
Location Gender 
John $61.5 million $270.0 million Northwest Male 
Carol $275.5 
million 
$1.4 billion Northwest Female 
Gary $1.9 billion $6.9 billion California Male 
Sam $1.3 billion $631.0 million California Male 
Jim $342.0 
million 
$363.0 million California Male 
Chris $592.9 
million 
$2.6 billion Northwest  Male 
 
CEOs encounter constant demands for their time, and the gatekeepers who shield 
their schedules are highly selective in granting access. For these reasons, the sample for 
this exploratory study was small: data were gathered from six CEOs. However, 
McCracken (1988) argues that working intimately with a few interviewees is more 
important than engaging superficially with a larger number of individuals, while 
acknowledging that the findings based on a small sample cannot be considered 
representative of the larger population.  
I gained access to the CEOs in the study through longstanding connections with 
investor relations officers, securities law attorneys, and CEOs known personally by me, 
who then provided access to other CEOs, resulting in a snowball sample. To increase the 
likelihood of gaining access and engaging in a more candid discussion, all participants 
were ensured confidentiality through informed consent provided by the Institutional 
Review Board of the University of Oregon. To further protect the confidentiality of the 
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participants, each CEO was assigned a pseudonym. These pseudonyms are listed in Table 
3.1. 
Hon and Grunig’s (1999) scales for examining the quality of successful 
relationships, which include trust, satisfaction, control mutuality, and commitment, 
provided the basis for the interview guide developed to investigate whether CEOs work 
to achieve these qualities in their relationships with investors. The semi-structured nature 
of the interviews intentionally created the opportunity for the CEOs to reveal the extent to 
which they rely on the two-way symmetrical model in their communication with 
investors, which J. E. Grunig and L. A. Grunig (1992) argue provides the greatest value 
to an organization’s effectiveness. Such a semi-structured approach to the interviews also 
allowed for new understandings to emerge from the interviewees’ perceptions of their 
experiences with their investors. 
Data were gathered through 30- to 60-minute in-depth interviews conducted face-
to-face and guided by open-ended questions using an interview guide. Charmaz (2006) 
has described such intensive interviewing as “open-ended yet directed, shaped yet 
emergent, and paced yet unrestricted” (p. 28). Such an approach made it possible to 
identify the factors that characterize and shape CEOs’ relationships with large 
institutional investors.  
McCracken (1988) argues for qualitative interviewing to be conducted in an 
“unobtrusive manner” (p. 21) that allows for private sharing and an intimate look into the 
nature of complex experiences. The office of each CEO provided a familiar, yet private 
setting for the face-to-face interviews that were free from interruptions because the 
interviews were scheduled well in advance after extensive discussion of the interviewing 
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purpose and process. In addition, the in-person meetings fostered more interpersonal 
engagement with each CEO than a telephone interview would have allowed. 
Data Analysis 
   The transcripts from the interviews as well as the researcher’s notes provided the 
raw data for analyzing the research participants’ relationships with their investors. 
Several grand-tour questions were used to begin the interviews: 
 Tell me about the biggest challenges you face as a CEO. What do you enjoy about 
it? What is least enjoyable about it? 
 What are the first things that come to mind when you think about the relationships 
you have with your major shareholders? 
 I then probed more specifically about the characteristics of relationships that these 
CEOs have with their investors based on the questions in the interview guide (Appendix 
B). To establish the CEO participants’ perspectives of the qualities that characterize their 
relationships with their major investors, responses to these questions were analyzed by 
organizing them into categories (Charmaz, 2006), including, for example, the behaviors 
of investors that the CEOs recall and the attitudes they associate with their major 
investors. Data from the interviews were further clustered around categories and 
subcategories related to the four dimensions that define the quality of relationships 
(satisfaction, trust, control mutuality and commitment) identified by Hon and J. E. Grunig 
(1999).  
    The coding paradigm used to select, separate, and sort data was open coding, axial, 
and selective coding (Strauss, 1987). The initial coding – open coding – included a close 
reading of the data during which the researcher was open to all that the data revealed 
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about the research participants’ perceptions of their experiences as CEOs engaging in 
relationships with their major stockholders. In addition, line-by-line coding was used 
during the open coding phase. Charmaz (2006) argues that line-by-line coding is 
particularly useful in the early analysis of data from in-depth interviews because it makes 
it possible to look at the data critically and to recognize, for example, implied concerns 
and underlying assumptions of the research participants. 
  Axial coding was then used to explore the data further and to create connections 
between categories and subcategories to determine how they are related to one another. 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), this strategy brings together the data that had 
been broken apart into specific pieces during initial coding and identifies relationships 
between categories to answer such questions as “when, where, why, who, how, and with 
what consequence” (p. 125). Through selective coding in the final stage of data analysis 
the most significant and/or reoccurring earlier codes were used to sift through over 100 
single-spaced pages of data. Decisions were made to identify which initial codes were 
most central to and related naturally to other codes. This process was the basis for 
categorizing the data thoroughly and creating an overarching organizational schema for 
the analysis (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss, 1987). Overall, open coding resulted in 12 
categories, which during axial coding were consolidated into six categories. 
Reflexivity 
McCracken (1988) posits that scholars who work within their own culture do not 
have a “critical distance from what they study” (p. 22). As a consequence, they are likely 
to make assumptions about the phenomenon they are examining based on a blinding 
sense of familiarity that can limit their ability as researchers to be critical observers. 
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Having worked with CEOs as an investor relations professional for more than 20 years, I 
provided counsel to them related to their communication and relationships with the 
investment community. Consequently, I have a deep understanding of the issues CEOs 
encounter with their investors and have observed firsthand the ways in which the 
relationships with investors unfold. This familiarity made it particularly important for me 
to successfully manufacture distance (McCracken, 1988) from participants in my 
research in order to maintain a critical awareness of the information and experiences they 
were relating. For example, when a CEO described a discussion with an investor in which 
the investor pressured the CEO to share information that had not been widely disclosed to 
other investors as required by regulatory guidelines, I needed to resist projecting my own 
experience with CEOs in the situation onto the specific experience of the CEOs in the 
research group as they described the incident. 
Another challenge I faced was facilitating a process that allowed for CEOs to be 
candid. CEOs are used to engaging in scripted performances, so creating a setting in 
which they were able to share authentically was particularly important to producing 
insightful data. In addition, by the nature of their leadership role, they often are guarded 
about revealing details of their experiences that may pose a threat to their perception of 
themselves, intellectually and emotionally. In order for the CEOs in this study to be 
unreserved about their experiences with investors, I needed to work diligently toward 
creating a balance between professional formality based on mutual respect and an 
informal sense of genuine connection with them as participants in the research. 
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Also, I was aware that my role as a social scientist in this research setting was quite 
different from my role as an investor relations professional advising CEOs of public 
companies.  
Reactivity 
 As mentioned earlier, the demands for CEOs’ time made gaining access to these 
individuals for in-person interviews particularly challenging. However, several of the 
participants specifically mentioned the importance of participating in scholarly research 
projects. 
 Three CEOs initially agreed to be interviewed but eventually declined. In two 
instances, gatekeepers intervened, and in another the individual decided he was unwilling 
to be audio recorded as the interview was getting underway. The audio recording was 
required by the study’s protocol. 
The six CEOs interviewed all had substantial experience engaging with investors 
and generally were unrestrained in sharing their experiences about their relationships 
with investors. All of the companies led by the interviewees had at some point in time 
during the CEOs’ tenure gone through periods of both weak and strong financial 
performance. Over the 24-month period from December 2011 to December 2013, the 
price of the stock of some of the companies had increased while in others it had 
decreased or remained essentially unchanged. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Throughout the interviews, each of the participants described a variety of factors 
that make building relationships with investors a constant challenge to them as CEOs of 
publicly traded companies. Chief among these are the constraints imposed by regulatory 
requirements on communication between publicly traded companies and their investors. 
The CEOs interviewed also discussed experiences that reveal the importance in the 
relationships these executives have with investors of qualities such as trustworthiness, 
transparency, honesty, and a willingness to be responsive and listen sincerely. The table 
in Appendix A lists the open and axial codes used in this section to provide a description 
of the qualities that CEOs believe define their relationships with their major investors. 
Regulatory Requirements Limit the Nature of the Relationships  
 
CEOs Engage in with Investors 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the codes leading to the analysis presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
Four of the six CEOs directly referenced the legal parameters established by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, including Regulation FD (REG FD), as being a 
constraining factor in their relationships with investors. The SEC adopted REG FD in 
August 2000 in response to its concerns related to the selective disclosure by publicly 
traded companies of material nonpublic information to the investment community, 
including stock analysts and shareholders, who might buy or sell stocks based on this 
information (NIRI, 2012). REG FD requires that when publicly traded companies 
communicate material information, which generally means any information that is 
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reasonably likely to influence investors’ buy or sell decisions or to have a significant 
impact on the market price of a publicly traded stock, they need to do so publicly, not 
selectively. With this regulation, the SEC’s intention is to create a level playing field for 
all investors by making material information available simultaneously to all participants 
in the stock market and, in particular, limiting CEOs’ and other company spokespersons’ 
discussion of critical developments to those previously announced and broadly 
disseminated to the public, primarily through news releases from the company. 
Table 4.1: Regulatory Requirements Limit Relationships Between CEOs and 
Investors 
 
Properties Open  Axial 
Tough 
Constant challenge to manage 
relationships 
Regulatory requirements limit 
the nature of the relationships 
CEOs engage in with investors 
Consistently discipline myself  
Play it straight 
Give everybody a level playing 
field 
No email exchanges 
Investors don’t make a decision 
from a distance, from just going to 
a conference, from online 
information 
As they make investment 
decisions, investors need to 
believe CEOs are trustworthy 
What CEOs say need to stand the 
test of time 
 
Gary described how this regulation affects his dialogue and relationship with his 
investors: 
One of the principal challenges is investors want an edge versus other investors 
and part of what they look for in their relationship with me or the company is to 
learn things that others don’t know – develop insights – that others don’t have. 
And to be consistent with REG FD, we’re obviously incentivized not to do that, 
but to give everybody a level playing field. And it’s a constant challenge to have 
investors feel close and have personal contact and feel like they have a 
relationship but give them nothing more than you give everybody in the 
marketplace. That’s tough – I think we do it, but it’s not easy. 
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To ensure he engages in a dialogue with his investors in a way that is in line with REG 
FD, this CEO  has to “constantly discipline” himself to “stay on message” and to provide 
“consistent” information to all of his investors – both large and small. He doesn’t 
exchange emails with investors, and when he has telephone conversations or in-person 
meetings with them, he makes certain to have either “an IR professional in the room or 
the CFO or some other member of the staff.”  He maintains a “level playing field” by 
trying to “play it straight” with all his investors and by being “responsive” to them, 
irrespective of their opinions about the company’s strategic direction or financial 
performance. 
John described the limited opportunity he has to discuss potential changes to 
strategic direction, operational initiatives, or uses of excess cash with his investors due to 
REG FD. Even though he’d like to ask informally for investors’ perspectives on certain 
key decisions being considered by the company, it is difficult, he said, to engage in such 
discussions with investors and not “tip your hand,” thereby, selectively disclosing 
information to these investors, which would be a violation of REG FD. Only if his 
industry, overall, is wrestling with an issue -- such as whether to use excess cash for stock 
buybacks or dividends -- does he feel comfortable asking his investors their general 
opinions about the issue. He said investors “always appreciated it” when they’ve had the 
opportunity to share what they are thinking about such issues with him. In situations 
where REG FD is not a concern, he has frequently asked investors for their feedback, for 
example, about the quality of information provided in company’s presentations delivered 
at Wall Street hosted conferences or on the length of conference calls with investors – are 
they “too long, too short?” 
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Chris said his company is “totally transparent” about past performance. He 
described the company’s news releases as “mini books.” His company provides investors 
“everything they need, so we don’t get that many questions.” He relies upon his legal 
counsel to ensure that disclosure related to future events and performance is consistent 
with regulatory requirements. 
Among other SEC provisions for public disclosure of information that 
interviewees discussed are those provisions requiring that communications cannot be 
false, misleading, or incomplete. After several highly visible public companies in the 
early 2000s, including Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and others, failed to abide by 
these requirements, Congress passed in 2002 the “Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act,” commonly known as Sarbanes Oxley or SOX. Included in 
these new reforms were additional and severe criminal and civil penalties for corporate 
misconduct and the requirement that CEOs and CFOs officially “certify” the reliability of 
their company’s financial statements and disclosures (NIRI, 2012). Gary and Sam both 
reported a keen awareness of the weight their words carry with investors and the 
responsibility they feel as CEOs to be honest with investors and to act with integrity at all 
times.  
As Sam said, 
If someone is going to invest millions of dollars into our company, I want to make 
sure they’re doing that on the real facts, the true facts. I don’t want to go to bed 
saying, “Boy, I think they got the wrong idea.”  There is enough responsibility to 
deliver on what I’ve said, which I feel a real responsibility to do. If I say 
something is going to happen, I better make it happen because people are 
investing. If I spun something and it was bigger that what it should be … I 
wouldn’t sleep at night. So I don’t want to mislead or flower things up by any 
means. I want to be just kind of straightforward, tell it like it is.  
 
Similarly, Gary described the responsibility he feels:  
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The long-term nature and the importance of whatever I say … is something I 
think about constantly. Knowing that whatever I say is going to influence a 
decision and it’s going to get played back, whether it’s one year from now, five 
years from now, or more. 
 
Five of the six CEOs  participating in the study reported spending a significant 
amount of their time – on average 30% annually – either meeting and talking with 
investors or thinking strategically about investor relations issues. This level of 
involvement with their investors is consistent with open coding that revealed the 
interviewees believe investors need to meet with and have a dialogue with CEOs.  
Jim, whose company is a small-cap with 2012 annual revenue of approximately 
$266 million, said that market capitalization may be a factor in investors’ expectations for 
gaining access to the CEO: 
In most companies below what you might refer to as a mid-cap stock, the 
investors want to see and talk to the CEO. They’re never going to be happy 
having the CFO go out on the road and be the one that they meet with face-to-face 
in one-on-one meetings or in the investor conferences. They want to see, talk to, 
and hear from and have a conversation with the CEO. 
 
Market capitalization categories typically are defined as mega-cap: more than $200 
billion; large-cap: more than $10 billion; mid-cap: $2 billion - $10 billion; small-cap 
$250 million - $2 billion; micro-cap less than $250 million; and nano-cap: less than $50 
million. 
John, whose company is a micro-cap with 2012 annual revenue of approximately 
$55 million, said:  
I absolutely believe they [investors] want to look into the eyes of the CEO. I don’t 
think they care whether or not I’m an eloquent speaker or use all the right words. 
They’re looking for honesty out of a person.  
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Sam, whose company is a small-cap with 2012 annual revenue of nearly $740 
million, described how the conversations and meetings that investors have with CEOs 
enable them “to feel comfortable” with a management team: 
They meet with us. They talk with us. They judge what we’re saying. Do they 
think we’re honest? Are we open? Or, are we just trying to market our stock? 
Over time, they can judge if we do what we say. Do we have credibility?  
 
As investors decide which companies to invest in, these discussions with CEOs 
give them the opportunity to assess whether or not a CEO is trustworthy. When CEOs 
demonstrate they are able to do what they say they are going to do, trust develops. Carol, 
whose company is a small-cap with 2012 revenue of approximately $285 million, 
describes her “biggest accomplishment” as: 
We have the respect of the investment community for doing what we say we’re 
going to do. If there’s something that is going to cause a financial detour from 
what they expect, even though we don’t give guidance, we really do try to let 
them know what circumstances could change it. 
 
Gary, whose company is at the higher end of the mid-cap range with 2012 annual revenue 
of nearly $1.5 billion, said:  
Trust is critical. What’s obvious to me it that people don’t make investments with 
a company from a distance. They rarely do. They’re not going to just go to a 
conference or they’re not going to read something online and decide probably 
they’re going to make a substantial investment. Serious investors want to meet 
management. They want to talk to them. They want to trust them.  
 
Sam also emphasized the importance of trust in his relationships with investors: 
 
I think trust is almost everything. If they can’t trust you as a CEO and trust what 
you say, then how do they know whether to invest in your company or not? I 
mean … trust permeates everything. So when an investor wants to invest, when 
he talks to us, he knows where we stand. He doesn’t have to say, “Well, is he 
telling me the truth? Or, is he trying to cover up a bad quarter? 
 
Chris, whose company is at the lower end of the mid-cap range with 2012 annual 
revenue of nearly $593 million, indicated that he doesn’t spend as much time meeting 
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with investors as he used to, although he does attend Wall Street conferences and meets 
in one-on-one meetings every now and then with investors. Unlike the other CEOs 
interviewed, his chief financial officer and others in his organization manage most of the 
interaction with the investment community. Similar to John, he believes in-person 
meetings with investors are preferable to telephone conversations and emails. “When 
they see the whites of your eyes, and I can see the whites of their eyes, I think you get 
more done.” Chris also discussed the importance of trust in relationships with investors: 
I think it [trust] is obviously important. I think more important is confidence. 
They [investors] have to have confidence in management or they would never 
invest … if they lose confidence or trust, they will sell, they will get out. 
 
 
CEOs Need to Engage with Investors Honestly and 
 
Openly in Good Times and Bad 
  
Table 4.2 summarizes the open and axial coding leading to the analysis presented in the 
following paragraphs. 
In addition to assessing trustworthiness, when investors interact with CEOs they 
are seeking “quality information” that will help them understand the story “behind the 
numbers.”  The interviewees explained that investors need to receive “prompt” responses 
to their questions and requests for information. Jim reported that he interacts with his 
investors in much the same way that he relates to his customers: 
I think you need to be very diligent and consistent and proactive in your 
communications and not let anything slip through the cracks. You’ve got to return 
phone calls quickly or in a timely manner. You have to provide them (investors) 
with materials…. You have to engage with them as if they were a customer, 
because what a customer would expect is all that too, right?  In many ways, they 
are a customer. They’re just buying stock as opposed to a product. 
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Table 4.2: CEOs Need to Engage with Investors Honestly and Openly in Good 
Times and Bad 
 
Properties Open  Axial 
Investors can access 
numbers online in the 10K 
and 10Q 
Investors want access to quality 
information 
CEOs need to engage with 
investors honestly and 
openly in good times and 
bad 
Talk about what’s behind 
the numbers 
Don’t mislead or flower 
things up 
Investors are customers; 
they’re just buying the stock 
as opposed to a product 
Return phone calls quickly 
Don’t pull covers over your 
head 
Investors will be disappointed when 
companies face the inevitable challenges 
of operating businesses in dynamic 
marketplaces 
Don’t try to avoid it 
Go to more Wall Street 
conferences 
Hold more one-on-one 
meetings with investors 
Do lengthier conference call 
Anticipate the questions 
Don’t try to time the truth 
 
John discussed a particularly “difficult” time in his industry when his company 
reported the “first quarterly loss” it had ever reported. Even though the company had 
informed investors “that there could be issues” and investors were anticipating these 
issues, the negative impact wasn’t clear until the quarterly results were reported: 
At that point, they’re [investors] disappointed – not disappointed in us but just 
disappointed in the quarter and then trying to determine whether they should exit 
their holding or ride it out. They make their own decisions, of course, but I don’t 
think they were ever really disappointed in the company or our discussion with 
then – just surprised it happened. 
 
He described advice he had received even before the difficult cycle occurred: “When 
things are bad, talk more. Be as available to your investors and potential investors as you 
can be. Be more visible, not less visible. Don’t pull the covers over you.” As the difficult 
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cycle continued to unfold, John said he made it a priority to proactively engage with 
investors. However, several of his company’s peers in the industry, which had 
traditionally done conference calls with investors, discontinued those calls. “When things 
went bad, they went silent.”  After these companies “wiped out their existing 
shareholders” they had to be financially restructured. While this CEO acknowledges that 
maintaining a commitment to communication and being “transparent” would not 
necessarily have prevented the need for the financial restructuring, he believes “it was a 
mistake not to be transparent and talking” through the industry’s difficult cycle.  
 Similarly, Chris emphasized the need to be available and candid with investors 
during difficult times: 
Accessibility is always a part of it, but it’s more important when things are tough 
because there’s a fear factor out there. They [investors] want to know what’s 
going on so I think you have to be totally accessible, and I think you have to be 
totally truthful. You even fudge a little bit you’re dead. The name of the game 
here is you tell the truth. ‘This is what’s going on. I got bad news. I got good 
news. This is what’s going on.’ I think it’s part of transparency. A lot of people 
think transparency is you just put stuff on a piece of paper and you’re good to go. 
No, it’s what comes out of your mouth, too. Tell people the truth. I don’t try to 
time the truth. For me, the truth needs to get out when it becomes obvious that is 
what is happening. 
 
Chris described a specific incident during a particularly dramatic decline in his 
company’s industry and the response from investors when he discussed the potential 
negative effect on his company and its financial performance: 
We went public with that. Wall Street hated me for that. They said, “Jesus, this is 
the first company in this industry that’s ever gone public with that.” They didn’t 
like it, they didn’t like it at all. Best decision we ever made doing that. Now, 
looking back at it, it added so much credibility to what we said. 
 
  Jim said that communication with stakeholders – whether employees, customers, 
vendors, or shareholders – is one of the major challenges any CEO faces. When people 
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are so busy that they hardly have time to do their jobs, it’s hard for them to be attentive 
listeners who can successfully process all the information they are bombarded with daily. 
Further complicating this environment, he says, is the fact “business is complicated” and 
difficult to “condense” into a “simple story that makes sense to everyone.” And when 
communicating with the investment community, in particular, most investors have “never 
actually worked for a company trying to make things happen.”  Even if they have at some 
time in their career, it usually is not in a business that is very similar to his. Nevertheless, 
he described what he believes has contributed to the “pretty positive” relationships he has 
with his investors: 
We have had a consistent level of outreach to them and have attempted to do our 
best to communicate in an open, honest, and transparent way, regardless of 
whether it was good news or bad news. I would say consistency of effort, 
consistency of engagement and messaging with them … where you really have to 
establish a rapport with them so you can have both the easy as well as the hard 
conversations.  
 
CEOs Feel a Responsibility to Listen to Investors 
 
Who Often Provide Valuable Insights 
 
Table 4.3 summarizes the open and axial coding leading to the analysis presented in the 
following paragraphs. 
Each of the CEOs interviewed said that when they meet and talk with investors 
they gain valuable feedback and insights. Jim said he feels an inherent responsibility to 
listen to investors and to take their concerns into consideration: 
I think if I’m going to expect them [investors] to patiently listen to me explain the 
realities of the company and the challenges and opportunities that we face, I 
should have a mutual responsibility to listen to what they have to say, to listen to 
their views on those subjects, to listen to their views on things like dividends and 
distributing capital to shareholders, and acquisitions and all that kind of thing. 
You don’t always agree on all of it and you can have a healthy debate about it, but 
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I think you have to have an open mind. You have to listen sincerely and have an 
honest communication in both directions. 
 
Table 4.3: CEOs Feel a Responsibility to Listen to Investors Who Often Provide 
Valuable Insights 
 
Properties Open  Axial 
Investors’ comments can be 
clarifying 
Investors’ opinions are taken 
seriously for the most part 
CEOs feel  a 
responsibility to listen to 
investors who often 
provide valuable insights 
Themes can emerge from 
discussions with investors  
Not all comments and opinions are 
taken seriously, if they are based on 
short-term returns rather than long-
term health of the company 
CEOs have a responsibility to listen 
sincerely to investors’ view on key 
initiatives 
Long-term investors ask a lot of 
questions 
CEOs want to spend their time 
with investors who take a long-
term view and will be long-
term investors (three to five 
years) 
Long-term investors study the team 
and the strategy 
Short-term investors want to know 
what might drive the stock up or 
down over the next few weeks or 
months. 
 
John described how investors “want to share their insights” and that this feedback 
helps him formulate some of his ongoing messaging. He assumes if one major investor 
“is curious about something,” everybody else may have “the same question, so let’s 
answer it.” In a similar way, Gary said he feels like he has “picked up an insight or 
emphasis that I wouldn’t have necessarily had myself,” based on questions major 
investors have asked and themes that have emerged in discussions with these investors. 
For the most part, Gary said he finds the opinions of investors “legitimate” and 
often “clarifying”: 
 
I have my own set of things that are the most important and that might be 
the most important strategically. But I always find it clarifying, interesting 
and focusing when I spend time with major investors, because sometimes 
they surprise us and focus on some things that I hadn’t really thought 
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about. When I reflect on it, they’re on a key value point that maybe I have 
undervalued. So I tend to take their comments seriously. Not always. Of 
course, when we have a long-term strategy or when we say we put patients 
first, if they’re willing to compromise that, okay, that’s different, or when 
they say, ‘Why don’t you go to a dividend policy?’ I’m not quick to jump 
to that sort of conclusion because one major investor says that – they may 
be interested in short-term returns rather than the long-term health of the 
company.  
 
Four of the CEOs interviewed expressed a strong preference for spending their 
time meeting and talking with investors who take a longer term view of their investments 
in public companies. In fact, Carol said that whenever she meets with new investors the 
“first thing” she wants to know is are they “long-term” or “short-term” investors, because 
she wants investors who share the company’s long-term vision. She is up front with 
investors from the beginning and tells them: 
We’re not going to manage our business on a quarter-to-quarter basis. If they’re 
looking for something that is going to run the stock up really fast so that they can 
take the gain and be out the next quarter, we’re just not the right stock for them. I 
think it’s important to be candid with them about what you’re looking for. 
 
Chris also described his commitment to managing his company with a long-term 
perspective even if it causes investors to sell their stock: 
We don’t run our company on a quarterly basis or a short-term basis. We look out 
on the horizon. We will make decisions today that could have a negative impact 
on a short-term basis, but we know long term it’s going to pay off in spades – we 
will do that. So we’re in it for the long haul. A lot of companies, unfortunately, 
run their organizations by quarterly earnings calls. We don’t. My attitude is 
investors have an opportunity. If they don’t like the direction we’re going or the 
decisions we’re making, sell your stock. 
 
Gary used the term “catalysts” to describe the focus of shorter-term investors who 
are seen by the CEOs interviewed as trying to determine what could possibly “drive a 
stock up or down in the near term” as they make investment decisions. He said: 
They’re not interested necessarily in long-term ownership, but ‘Can I get in at 
some low point and get out quickly and have a quick return?’ Obviously, we’re 
43 
 
less interested in that kind of investor. My energy, my time and going to the 
offices of people or my time that I spend in one-on-one meetings is focused on 
people that we believe will take a long view and be a long-term investor. 
 
Long-term investors, according to Gary, are willing to be in a stock for five years or 
more. These long-term investors take the time to “study the company deeply,” including 
the management team and the company’s strategy. They are “far more deliberate” and 
“ask a lot of questions,” and “their questions tend to be very different than those that 
might be focused on what’s going to happen over the next few weeks or few months.” 
Sam characterized longer-term investors as those he can sit down and talk with 
about the company from a long-term viewpoint: 
We can talk about the industry and our competitors. They invest in some 
competitors, and so they know what makes us different, and they understand that. 
So, those are the best conversations.  
 
Similar to Carol and Gary, Sam described short-term investors as those “just looking for 
a quick dollar.” The conversations with these investors have a different focus than with 
“somebody who is truly interested in our industry and our company.”  With longer-term 
investors, he talks about the advantages his company has over the competition and 
“where we’re going and why we think we can get there, and has a good solid 
conversation.” 
CEOs Have Multiple Audiences, in Addition to Investors, 
 
to Consider When Making Decisions 
 
Table 4.4 summarizes the codes leading to the analysis presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
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Table 4.4: CEOs Have Multiple Audiences, in Addition to Investors, to Consider 
When Making Decisions 
Properties Open  Axial 
Investors’ principal goal is 
making money 
CEOs can reach out to 
investors and make it clear 
who the company is, but 
investors judge whether to 
invest of not 
CEOs have multiple 
audiences, in addition to 
investors to consider 
when making decisions 
Investors will sell if 
fundamentals change 
Investors will sell if 
competitive position 
changes 
Investors will tolerate 
surprises only if they 
continue to trust the CEO 
Credibility helps mitigate 
investors’ concerns about 
CEOs passing up certain 
opportunities 
CEOs make decisions about 
their companies based not just 
on what investors think but on 
what is right for the company 
overall 
CEOs are trying to do 
what is right for 
employees, customers, as 
well as investors 
 
While the CEOs interviewed preferred having major investors willing to take a 
long-term view of their investments, these CEOs also recognize that their investors’ 
primary goal is making money.” As a result, these investment professionals tend to 
measure a public company’s performance based on how they get measured, which is on 
“quarterly and annual returns.”  Gary believes that even investors who have a long-term 
view “measure their happiness in the short term.”  He said: 
I think their joy or lack of joy with us is directly related to did we help them 
distinguish themselves from the crowd or not? Are they willing to stay in there 
even if they get disappointed? Yes. Do I think their disappointment or happiness 
rises or fall with the most recent results? I think it does. 
 
So while near-term results also are important to long-term investors, these 
investors are likely to tolerate near-term disappointments, Gary said, “if all their original 
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assumptions still hold about the quality of the strategy, the quality of the leadership team, 
and the quality of the execution.” However, if a “new fact pattern emerges” that reveals 
the “market opportunity” or “competitive position” has changed or if management has 
proved to be untrustworthy, even investors with a long-term view will decide: “I’m 
getting out.”  However, such decisions by long-term investors are related to changes in 
“the fundamentals” rather than “near-term results,” Gary said.  
According to Jim, managing expectations to avoid disappointments is “the holy 
grail of being a CEO” in his industry, but inevitably investors will still face 
disappointments, at some point. He said. 
When that happens you just got to talk about it, right? You can’t try to gloss over 
it. You can’t try to avoid it. You can’t try to sugarcoat it. You just got to 
acknowledge: “We’ve screwed up here. Here’s why we think that happened and 
here is what we’ve done about it.” 
 
When investors experience such disappointments, he thinks “all of them become more 
skeptical,” but the length of the relationship with management will determine how 
understanding investors are willing to be about a disappointment. Rebuilding “trust” and 
“credibility” will take some time, he said. Depending on the circumstances, this 
rebuilding can take “anywhere from one to two quarters to four quarters.” 
Sam explained that investors often exit an investment in a company for reasons 
unrelated to a company and its performance. They may have “better opportunities, so as a 
CEO, you don’t want to take that personally.” His approach is to tell investors:  
‘Here’s who we are as a company. Here’s where we’re trying to go. Here’s our 
strategy to get there. Here’s the team that can execute that strategy. Hopefully, 
that fits your investment criteria.’  
 
Generally, he is not going to alter his strategy to try and satisfy an investor. He’s trying to 
do what is right for the company, he said, which includes satisfying customers and 
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keeping employees motivated, because these are the “ingredients” that make the company 
successful. “That’s where I focus. Hopefully, investors find us an attractive investment.” 
Chris emphasized that his relationship with his employees differs from his 
relationship with investors, primarily because he spends time every day with his 
employees. He tells his employees that even though his business card says “CEO,” his 
real job is “head of support,” because his job is to ensure his employees have the 
resources needed to achieve “some incredible goals” he gives them. Like investors, Chris 
said his employees value the truth and need to have confidence in management and 
access to management:  
They [employees] have to have confidence in you. They’ve got to believe in what 
you’re trying to do. I’m always in front of our people, and they know that I will 
always tell them the truth. They have to have confidence in the leadership of the 
organization. That we’re going down the right path. That we aren’t going to 
mislead them or mistreat them. That we’ll treat them with respect and 
understanding. 
 
He described his company’s “greatest asset” as the culture of the organization:  
 
Our culture is so centered around empowerment of people, empowering people to 
make day-to-day decisions. Yet there’s this undercurrent of tough love you have 
to have because you can’t have empowerment without accountability. Enron had 
that. You can’t have that. There has to be some sort of discipline. 
 
 
Investors Rely on Intangibles to Determine if CEOs 
 
Can Deliver Results 
 
Table 4.5 summarizes the codes leading to the analysis presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
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 Table 4.5: Investors Rely on Intangibles to Determine If CEOs Can Deliver Results 
Properties Open  Axial 
Investors want to see leadership 
teams that are trustworthy 
Investors look not only at 
numbers but also at whether 
they trust management to hit 
those numbers 
Investors rely on 
intangibles to 
determine if CEOs 
can deliver results 
Leadership needs to 
consistently do the right thing 
Leadership needs to be 
personally invested in the future 
(of the company) themselves 
Leadership needs to be 
balanced; not so enthusiastic 
that they don’t see reality 
Establishing a level of rapport 
with investors gains credibility 
and respect for CEOs 
CEOs demonstrate 
commitment to their 
investors by making sure 
investors understand the 
company 
Investors expect CEOs to 
deliver strong results based on 
understanding the true levers of 
the business 
 
Investors demonstrate their 
satisfaction by increasing or 
decreasing their stock 
ownership positions in a 
company 
 
All of the CEOs interviewed talked about the significance of intangibles, 
including honesty, respect, transparency, accessibility, and trust, in their relationships 
with their major investors. Jim said he believes “intangibles are probably more important 
than the tangibles” to investors. He explained: 
I think a company can be performing poorly, but if there are rational explanations 
for that and you have a plan in place that you’re executing on to rectify it, I think 
investors will stick with you or buy into that vision. All that is built not on the 
hard quantitative data. That’s built on the qualitative stuff – on the intangibles. 
 
Gary and Sam agreed that intangibles, particularly trust, are important. While investors 
“invest in the numbers,” Sam said, their interpretation of a management team’s ability “to 
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hit those numbers” is also important. And Gary distinguished between “likeability and 
trust.” He believes that investors can “like a management team and the company as well 
as its mission,” but they have to like the stock, too, which gets “a little more technical 
than, ‘Do I like the people?’ He explained: 
You can like somebody but find them terribly optimistic and kind of dreamy. As 
an investor that would scare you, right? I can like him a lot, I can want to go have 
a beer with him, and I could maybe even what to work for him, but I’m not sure I 
want to trust him with this pile of dough. The trust is I want somebody 
discriminating, grounded, thorough, and tough. Some of those things may not 
come through with somebody that’s likeable. I think investors know they’re 
different. There’s no one investor, but there is something about trust probably 
being more important than likeability. 
 
In addition to expecting CEOs to be “trustworthy and honest, even when it’s 
uncomfortable,” Gary believes investors want leaders that “they feel are balanced, not so 
enthusiastic that they can’t see reality.” He said, they want people who “work hard and 
are constantly doing the right thing and people that are personally invested in the future 
themselves.”  
             Carol said that she’s been involved with most of her investors “off and on for 10 
years or more,” and when you spend that kind of time with them, a “rapport that is 
respectful” develops. They “trust that we’re going to tell them the truth.”  
She said that “transparency” and “going the extra mile to make sure people really 
understand things” contributes to the trust she has among investors. Carol 
provides investors as much information as possible –whether in news releases, 
conference calls, or in one-on-one meetings at investor conferences – so that the 
“analysts can figure out their models and the investors can make their decisions. 
They appreciate that a lot,” she said. 
 
Investor Relations and Public Relations Share  
 
Some Common Ground 
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Table 4.6 summarizes the codes leading to the analysis presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
While five of the six CEOs indicated that some similarities exist between investor 
relations and public relations, all of the participants identified differences between the 
two disciplines. Carol and Sam both described investor relations as being more directed 
toward a single audience than public relations, even though both functions focus on 
making sure key publics understand the company. According to Carol, “Investor relations 
is targeted, but public relations touches investors as well as every community that we 
serve.” She emphasized that the individuals responsible for public relations need to 
understand “how the company is doing financially” and also “reflect the same tone” as 
the company’s investor relations. 
Sam described public relations as telling the story of  “the broader company,” 
whereas investor relations is “talking about financials and how you’re going to achieve 
financial results.” 
Jim stressed that “they [public relations and investor relations] are different 
beasts,” although both functions share common communication challenges. At his 
company, the same individual manages both investor relations and public relations. 
However, he believes “the larger you get as a company, the more specialization you can 
have and the higher quality talent you’ll recruit to do each of these.” 
At small-cap companies like his, “one person has to do more than one thing.” He 
described the similarities and differences he sees between the two disciplines: 
I think there is common ground in the sense that you’re attempting to 
communicate with third parties who have a lot of the same challenges in terms of 
limited attention spans and a multitude of things on their agendas. I would say 
that it [public relations] is sometimes harder. The investors are motivated by 
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money, and so they have an inherent interest in at least hearing what you have to 
say. The media are interested in what’s going to provide them with copy that’s 
going to drive readership. If you don’t have what’s perhaps a trendy or what’s 
viewed as being a hot area, you can try as hard as you want and you’re never 
getting any attention or any press out of it. 
 
Table 4.6: Investor Relations and Public Relations Share Some Common Ground 
Properties Open  Axial 
Public relations is sometimes 
harder than investor relations 
Public relations looks at the 
company’s overall image and 
its products 
Investor 
relations and 
public relations 
share some 
common ground 
The media is motivated by what 
will sell newspapers or draw 
viewers 
The media tend to be sensational 
Investors are motivated to make 
money, so they listen to CEOs 
communicate about their 
companies 
Public relations and investor 
relations share the challenge of 
communicating with third 
parties, but they are different 
beasts 
Employees, customers and 
citizens of the local community 
can all be investors, so the 
messages have to be the same to 
all audiences 
The common measurement of a 
public company among 
employees, customers, investors, 
and local community is the stock 
price 
Public relations professionals 
need to understand how the 
company is doing financially 
Both public relations and investor 
relations require the ability to 
listen and explain things with 
patience while also being timely, 
proactive and responsive 
 
John believes “public relations is very different from investor relations.” He is the 
face of investor relations for his company but not the face of public relations. Because of 
this difference, he doesn’t believe any company should have the same individual doing 
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both investor relations and public relations. He believes it would be unusual for an 
individual to be able to do both effectively: 
Public relations is newspapers, editors, journalists, the public. What is the public 
perception of your company? It’s going to be about service. It’s going to be about 
products. It’s going to be about how you are differentiated in the community. 
Investor relations is all about capital. It’s all about deployment of capital. It’s all 
about returns. It’s just completely different. 
 
Gary also compared investor relations to public relations from a media relations 
perspective: 
 
I’d say for the most part, the media is motivated by their own goals of what’s 
going to sell: ‘What’s going to sell a newspaper? What going to draw viewers?’ 
They [the media] tend to want to be sensational. They tend to want to dramatize 
the present. I think that’s far more the case than I see with investors, especially 
the kind of investors that I would say are preferred investors for us, the longer 
term [investors]. 
 
But Gary finds the “boundaries blurring more and more” between investor relations and 
public relations: 
 
I was naïve enough when I first started all this to think my messages to the media 
versus my messages to investors versus my messages to customers versus my 
messages to my employees or my messages to the local community were five 
different messages. They’re one. They must be, and you have to stand up to 
scrutiny because there is an overlap. Investors can be all of those and vice versa. I 
find the only way to do this is to have consistent messages and not to have 
customized messages per audience. When you start trying to separate media from 
investors, I have a tough time being able to segregate those in the world that we 
live in.  
 
Stock price is one of the common denominators that nearly every audience uses as 
a “measuring stick” for public companies, according to Gary. Whether he is talking with 
his employees, his neighbors, who might be casual investors, customers or the media, 
they are all going to be interested in the stock price, at some point. Although he 
acknowledges other issues also cross over and are of interest to all of a public company’s 
audiences, stock price dominates as the issue to which all stakeholders pay some 
attention. 
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I do think there is a character issue. I do think there’s a trust issue that exists. I do 
think there’s a message, and there’s a mission/vision part of this that crosses over. 
I do think there is something consistent that says, ‘Yeah, that’s the kind of 
company that I would work for, a company that I would buy from, a company that 
I’d own stock in.’ Those kind of things I think do tend to go together. But the 
other thing – just being a little bit more cynical – what they measure is just stock 
price. That’s what it is all about. 
 
Jim and Gary both talked about what they consider the most important 
achievements of an investor relations program. Jim evaluates the success of his 
company’s investor relations efforts by the number of new shareholders the company 
attracts during a 12-month period “because they’re the people who will fuel the marginal 
demand [for the stock] and hopefully build their positions to higher levels in future 
years.” He also looks at the quality and timeliness of information provided to investors 
through news releases, including earnings news releases, and the investor relations 
section of the company’s website. 
Gary measures the effectiveness of his company’s investor relations program by 
its ability to create interest in the stock among the company’s preferred investors – long-
term investors. He looks at the company’s 10 largest investors and the quality of those 
people. If the company’s investor base consists of the kind of investors the leadership 
team and board of directors prefers to have as owners of the company, “our investor 
relations team has done its job. Obviously, the company has to perform as well, but the 
IR team has to perform, too.” He said investor relations professionals need to be “highly 
credible and highly responsive”: 
I think investors by their nature – because they’re risking a lot of capital and their 
own careers in many ways – they want answers, and they want somebody to 
answer their questions promptly, and they want people to give them a realistic 
answer. And so I think it’s really important that our investor relations team 
provides access and that our team provide realism. There’s also another thing that 
I think everyone would look for. Does the IR team, are they in sync with the rest 
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of management? Do they have access to information? Do they really know? 
That’s the other thing that I think impresses investors – if investor relations really 
knows the answer. They’re not guessing; they are not deferring answers because 
they’re uninformed. In other words, they need to be deeply informed.  
 
Jim said that among the most important skills for both public relations and 
investor relations professionals is “the ability to manage interpersonal relationships with 
a company’s diverse stakeholders. He indicated managing such relationships requires 
being patient, being a good listener, and being willing to explain information and issues 
to audiences who have different levels of knowledge about a company. 
John said “IR professionals are helpful, but you cannot hide behind them.” He 
described investor relations’ role as assisting in arranging meetings with investors and 
organizing roadshows. “They [IR professionals] can help you understand what type of 
investors you have, but they cannot write your earnings news releases – they can edit 
your news releases.”  While his company has never had an in-house IR professional, it 
has worked with a consulting firm briefly. Currently, he is driving the function as the 
CEO. “I’m not sure that’s right, but that’s where we are at the moment.” 
Summary 
The results that emerged through the open and axial coding process reveal that 
CEOs of public companies face challenges when building relationships with their 
investors – a key public. Regulatory agencies, including the SEC, require CEOs of these 
companies to pay close attention to maintaining a level playing field among investors by 
avoiding the selective disclosure of market-moving information to any investor. Yet these 
regulations do not prohibit investors from seeking such material information. As a result, 
CEOs navigate a tightrope as they work to demonstrate a commitment to investors by 
satisfying these investors’ ongoing need for information without violating regulatory 
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requirements, including REG FD. Despite the challenge of engaging with investors in this 
highly regulated communication environment, the CEOs interviewed described 
experiences that make it possible for them to have mutually beneficial relationships and a 
constructive dialogue with their investors characterized by trust and mutual respect. The 
data showed that the interviewees believe intangibles are as important to investors as 
tangibles. A prevailing belief emerged that when inevitable disappointments occur and 
investors are deciding whether to stay invested in the company or sell their stock, a 
trustworthy relationship with the CEO can be a deciding factor. The CEOs interviewed 
said they consider the opinions of their investors legitimate most of the time, although 
these CEOs manage their companies for the longer term, keeping in mind all of their 
stakeholders’ interests, including employees and customers as well as investors. Based on 
the data, CEOs have expectations of their investors, and they distinguish between long-
term investors and short-term investors with a preference for long-term investors who 
will hold their stock for several years. Discussion of the common ground between public 
relations and investor relations revealed that while CEOs believe there are some 
similarities, they also identified differences between the two disciplines.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The following section discusses the results of the study as it investigated the 
relevance of relationship management theory to investor relations, a relatively new 
discipline that only recently has begun to receive the attention of scholars. The study’s 
results are presented in relation to existing literature, the selective code developed from 
the open and axial codes discussed in Chapter IV is outlined, and recommendations for 
practical applications and future research are made. But first, limitations should be noted. 
Limitations 
Participants were limited to a small group of CEOs leading publicly traded 
companies on the West Coast. As a result, while the interviews offer important insights 
about the role of investor relations from the perspective of CEOs whom investors 
ultimately hold accountable for a public company’s performance, the conclusions drawn 
from the study cannot be generalized to the broader population of public company CEOs. 
As discussed in Chapter III, I initially identified potential interview participants 
based on publicly available lists of publicly traded companies on the West Coast. I then 
gained access to the interviewees through longstanding professional connections I had 
with investor relations officers, securities law attorneys, and the CEOs I know personally 
who provided access to other CEOs resulting in a snowball sample. This sampling 
process resulted in a relatively varied group of research participants based on annual 
revenue, market capitalization, and business sectors. In addition, one female CEO is 
included among the interviewees, even though women hold only 4.2% of the CEO 
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positions at Fortune 500 companies and only 16.9% of the board seats at these companies 
(Bennet & Murray, 2013). Time constraints and accessibility limited the opportunity to 
recruit a larger and more diverse sample of CEOs. Also, financial resources limited the 
sample to companies on the West Coast to which I could travel with minimal expense. 
The sample is likely biased toward CEOs with a positive disposition toward 
building quality relationships with investors because this is the approach my investor 
relations colleagues and I have advocated with the public companies we have represented 
over the years. For example, one of the CEOs who facilitated my access to an interviewee 
was a CEO for whom I had led a highly proactive program to engage with investors. 
Access to another interviewee was arranged through a longstanding investor relations 
colleague actively involved over the years in the leadership of the national NIRI 
organization, the leading association for investor relations professionals. NIRI is 
recognized among investor relations professionals for its focus on advancing best practice 
communication with the investment community. CEOs who tend to believe that 
engagement with investors does not add value to their companies and who believe 
investors’ decisions to buy or sell a stock are driven almost exclusively by financial 
results were less likely to be interested in participating in the research. The study does not 
include content analysis of CEO communication with investors through news releases, 
annual reports, earnings teleconferences, webcasts or SEC filings, and it does not include 
observation of CEOs as they engage with their investors. Nevertheless, the data offer 
insight into the lived experiences of CEOs as they build relationships and communicate 
with investors as well as these CEOs’ perceptions of the qualities that characterize these 
relationships. 
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Selective Coding 
The selective coding process results from examining the open and axial codes that 
emerged in response to the research questions. Selective coding is the process by which 
open and axial codes are probed to determine the essential variable that exerts the greatest 
influence in shaping the behavior and experiences of the participants in the study. 
Examining the axial codes that emerged from the research presented in this study reveals 
that unlike CEOs of other organizations, CEOs of public companies are constantly 
challenged by the constraining effects of regulatory requirements as they engage in 
relationships with investors as a key stakeholder group. 
Building and maintaining relationships with investors is critical to CEOs and their 
companies who depend on investors for the capital needed to thrive and survive as 
competitive businesses in the marketplace. Yet, the communication and interactions 
between public companies and their investors are highly regulated as the SEC and the 
stock exchanges work to maintain a level playing field for investors and to hold public 
companies accountable for the accuracy, truthfulness and completeness of the 
information they provide investors and the general public. After several high-profile 
public companies violated these regulatory requirements in the early 2000s, new reforms 
took effect that included additional and severe criminal and civil penalties for officials of 
public companies who engage in corporate misconduct.  
More recently, investors’ and public trust were further shaken by the economic 
crisis of the late 2000s. The need to regain this trust is considered the most serious 
challenge facing the senior executives of today’s public companies (Lev, 2012). This is 
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the landscape that CEOs of public companies navigate as the work to build relationships 
and communicate with investors. 
Because of the complexity of managing communication and building 
relationships with investors in the regulated environment, CEOs spend a substantial 
portion of their time involved in the strategic planning of investor relations activities and 
communicating directly with investors. As they engage with investors, CEOs are keenly 
aware of the importance to this stakeholder group of trustworthiness. They believe that to 
gain investors’ trust they need to communicate openly and honestly about what they are 
trying to accomplish both in good times and bad, and they need to be able to demonstrate 
that they have the ability to do what they say they can do. Building such trustworthy 
relationships with investors can help CEOs attract the investors they prefer to have 
owning their companies’ stock – long-term investors. These investors tend to be more 
deliberate than short-term investors. They study the company and its strategy more 
deeply. When the inevitable disappointments come, investors who trust the CEO are less 
likely to sell the company’s stock. In this way, trustworthy relationships with investors 
can result in a tangible financial benefit for public companies. 
While CEOs would like to give investors the opportunity to provide feedback on 
major decisions their companies are considering, regulatory requirements limit the input 
CEOs can seek from investors. This is because discussing such potential decisions might 
hint at future material events and violate the regulatory requirement prohibiting the 
selective disclosure of material information, or REG FD. Nevertheless, CEOs believe 
they have a responsibility to listen sincerely to investors who often provide valuable 
insights that might not occur to them otherwise. They also feel a responsibility to keep an 
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open mind and engage in a healthy debate with investors when there is a difference of 
opinion. Such a two-way approach to communication expands CEOs’ understanding of 
their investors’ interests and creates a greater likelihood that the CEOs and their 
management teams will align their decision making with investors’ when possible. 
Even though investors represent a powerful stakeholder group for CEOs of public 
companies because of the capital they provide, these CEOs make their decisions based on 
what they believe is right for the company in the long term, taking into consideration 
their multiple constituencies not just investors. The dramatic growth in effective 
communication channels in recent years makes it necessary for CEOs today to take this 
broader view of their companies’ stakeholders. As a result, CEOs of public companies 
are more aware of the value that communication brings to their organizations, which has 
begun to blur the boundaries between investor relations and public relations. However, 
while CEOs in the study view investor relations as building trustworthy and open 
relationships with investors, they perceive public relations to be about gaining publicity. 
This suggests a gap between how public relations professionals describe their discipline’s 
purpose (PRSA, 2014) and the perception of CEOs. Equally important, Kelly, Laskin, 
and Rosenstein’s (2010) study found a discrepancy between PRSA’s description of 
public relations – a strategic communication role aimed at building relationships that 
mutually benefit an organization and its public – and the way these professionals practice 
public relations. Rather than managing relationships to pull stakeholders toward the 
organization, today’s public relations professionals predominately practice press 
agentry/media relations to push information from the organization outward to 
stakeholders.  
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This study contributes to the knowledge of relationship management theory by 
examining the relevance of this established public relations theory to investor relations. 
In addition, it contributes to ongoing research on the dimensions that characterize 
successful organization-public relationships by investigating whether CEOs of public 
companies work to achieve trust, satisfaction, control mutuality, and commitment (Hon & 
Grunig, 1999) in their relationships with a key public – investors. While CEOs of public 
companies are constrained by regulatory requirements as they engage with investors, this 
study shows that the relationships CEOs of public companies have with their investors 
are characterized by all four dimensions, although trust is the quality that emerged as 
most important and control mutuality as the quality most difficult to achieve due to 
regulatory requirements.  
Also, because much of relationship management when applied to investor 
relations resembles personal one-on-one interactions, further research is needed to 
examine models of interpersonal communication to better understand how they may be 
relevant to the relationships public companies engage in with investors. Other scholars 
(Brunig, 2001; Gallicano, Curtin, & Matthews, 2012) also have suggested that as the 
study and practice of public relations moves toward relationship management and the 
communication with key stakeholders – both external and internal – becomes more 
personal, public relations practitioners need to adjust their communication with these 
stakeholders in a way that creates more interpersonal interactions. By drawing upon its 
roots in interpersonal communication, relationship management theory can more fully 
inform and advance the study and practice not only of public relations but also investor 
relations. 
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Discussion 
The dominant theme that emerged from the study is the constant challenge CEOs 
of public companies face as they engage in relationships with investors, primarily due to 
the constraining effects of regulatory requirements. Unlike other organizations, the CEOs 
and leadership teams of publicly traded companies continually balance two frequently 
competing concerns. They need to provide transparent and reliable information to 
investors who can use this information to affect the companies’ market valuation by 
deciding to buy or sell the companies’ securities. The information of interest to these 
investors and which they persistently seek from public companies, as several of the 
interviewees reported, is market-moving information. Yet, the disclosure of such material 
information is highly regulated with serious legal implications if the regulatory 
requirements are violated – either intentionally or inadvertently. Such a communication 
environment has been compared to walking a tight rope (Thompson, 1996), and CEOs 
navigate this environment daily as they work to communicate and build relationships 
with investors. Nevertheless, none of the CEOs in the study noted the risk of potential 
federal securities class-action lawsuits as a deterrent to proactively engaging with their 
investors. This is despite a continued rise in such lawsuits against U.S. corporations by 
shareholders in 2013, which represented the largest yearly increase since 2008, with 
settlements nearly doubling to $6.5 billion (Wall Street Journal, 2014). 
It is the complexity of managing communication and building relationships with 
investors in a regulated environment that may explain why five of the six CEOs 
interviewed indicated that they spend nearly one third of their time overseeing strategic 
direction of investor relations activities and communicating directly with investors, which 
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affirms Scott’s (2005) report that CEOs in major public companies spend on average 
25% of their time dealing with the financial community. In addition, the fact that CEOs 
focus a substantial amount of their time on investors speaks to the importance of 
investors as a key stakeholder group to public companies. L.A. Grunig (1992) has argued 
that public companies may be compelled to engage with investors as a priority 
stakeholder group because they rely upon the capital investors provide to them. 
The findings of the study suggest that the level of direct involvement CEOs have 
with investors may vary depending on a number of factors, including market 
capitalization, industry sector, the financial condition of the company as well as the 
strength or weakness of the company’s industry, and the leadership style and values of 
individual CEOs. For example, one of the interviewees observed most investors of mid-
cap companies and smaller expect to have direct access to the CEO, in addition to the 
CFO and the investor relations practitioner. All of the CEOs in the current study lead 
companies that are mid-cap or smaller. Therefore, these CEOs may expect to be actively 
engaged with their investors. In addition, several of the companies participate in 
industries – technology and medical devices – which typically attract investors who 
expect broad access to senior level executives, including the CEO. Several other CEOs in 
the study lead companies in an industry emerging from a particularly difficult cycle – 
financial services and banking – which may require they remain visible and accessible to 
their investors. 
The data also suggest company size may determine who beyond the C-Suite is 
most actively involved in investor relations. The CEO leading the micro-cap company in 
the study is “the face of investor relations” but not public relations. In the three small-cap 
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companies, the responsibility for investor relations and public relations rests primarily 
with one individual in the organization who manages both functions. In the largest cap 
company, several investor relations professionals, including a vice-president of investor 
relations, lead the function with the CEO and other senior executives. In contrast, the 
CEO of the other mid-cap company said the company’s CFO and legal counsel had 
primary responsibility for investor relations, while he focuses on his employees. 
Another pervasive theme in the interview data is the importance of building 
relationships with investors characterized by trustworthiness, transparency, honesty, and 
a willingness to be responsive and listen sincerely. This finding suggests that relationship 
management theory, which argues that initiating, maintaining, and expanding 
relationships with key publics is the ultimate measure of successful public relations, has 
particular relevance to investor relations. While the current study generally confirmed 
that the interviewees value Hon and Grunig’s (1999) qualities of trust, satisfaction, 
control mutuality, and commitment in the relationships they have with their investors, 
CEOs’ most frequently discussed relationship quality that they work to achieve is trust. 
This finding suggests that CEOs recognize the need as discussed by scholars for business 
leaders and organizations to regain both investors’ and public trust that several high-
profile companies during the early 2000s and the economic crisis of the late 2000s 
severely compromised (Lev, 2012; Rawlins, 2007; Ryan & Bucholt, 2011; and Shockley-
Zalabak & Morreale, 2011). In addition, the interviewees reported that doing what they 
say they will do is fundamental to establishing and maintaining trust, which is consistent 
with Hon and Grunig’s (1999) scale in which two of the underlying dimensions of trust 
are dependability (an organization will do what it says it will do), and competence (an 
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organization has the ability to do what it says it will do). Another underlying dimension 
of trust (Hon & Grung, 1999) is integrity (an organization is fair and just). The CEOs 
described a strong sense of responsibility to deal honestly with their investors and to 
avoid minimizing financial and operational disappointments. This willingness to be 
accountable to their investors and to “do the right thing at all times” suggests that CEOs 
recognize investors expect the leadership of public companies to act with integrity as they 
engage with investors, realizing that these investors put their capital at risk when they 
become investors. 
The interview data described above suggest that the CEOs also recognize their 
relationships with investors are defined not only by the information and good intentions 
communicated in their ongoing interactions with investors but also by their behavior. For 
example, one CEO described the “respect” her company has earned among investors for 
“doing what we say we’re going to do” as her biggest accomplishment. Such findings are 
consistent with public relations scholars, including Grunig (1993) and Brunig (2001), 
who have argued that organization-public relationships are defined not only by “symbolic 
(communication-based) relationships but also by behavioral (grounded in actions and 
events) relationships” (Grunig, 1993, p. 136).  
Another contributing factor to the interviewees’ expanded awareness of the 
necessity to build trustworthy relationships with their investors may result from the 
increased significance to investors of such intangibles as “integrity, vision and 
leadership” (Charlier, 2013, p. 7). Such intangibles, as Laskin (2011) reported, can 
constitute more than 50% of the criteria used today for making investments. In the 
current study, the CEOs reported that when a company fails to meet its investors’ 
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expectations, investors are likely to accept “rational explanations” for the disappointment, 
if the CEO is someone they believe is trustworthy. In other words, building trustworthy 
relationships with investors can result in a tangible financial benefit for a public company 
by increasing the likelihood investors will be long-term investors. Laskin (2011) reported 
a similar finding from interviews with investor relations practitioners who reported that 
proactive, transparent, and trustworthy communication leads to greater patience among 
investors and a willingness to hold shares when companies encounter inevitable setbacks 
and disappointments. 
Four of the six CEOs in the study indicated that attracting investors who will hold 
their companies’ stock for the long term is a high priority outcome as they engage with 
investors. According to the interviewees, these patient investors who take a longer-term 
view of their investments behave differently from short-term investors. They seek a more 
thorough level of understanding of the company and engage in a more deliberate dialogue 
with company officials. A relationship management approach to engaging with investors 
may help these CEOs achieve the outcome of attracting long-term investors given that a 
relationship with a public company increases the likelihood that individuals and 
institutions will invest for the long-term (Kelly et al., 2010). Similarly, Ledingham and 
Brunig (1998) argue that successful relationships with key publics can “differentiate 
stayers and leavers in competitive environments” (p. 63). 
Of the four qualities of successful organization-public relationships identified by 
Hon and Gruing (1999), the study’s findings suggest that control mutuality, or the degree 
of shared power, is the relationship quality that is most difficult to achieve, due primarily 
to securities law compliance. While the interviewees reported they often wanted to 
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discuss with investors certain decisions or courses of action being contemplated, they 
were unable to do so because discussing such potential decisions might hint at future 
material events, thereby violating REG FD. However, control mutuality assumes some 
degree of power imbalance is natural in organization-public relationships (Hon and 
Grunig, 1999). Such an imbalance is confirmed by this study’s findings.  
Despite the inherent imbalance of shared power between public companies and 
investors resulting from regulatory constraints, Apple Inc.’s investors recently 
demonstrated that some equilibrium can be achieved. As noted in Chapter I, at Apple’s 
annual meeting in February 2013 angry investors voiced their dissatisfaction with the 
company’s financial performance, executive pay, and struggling stock price, which had 
declined 30% in five months during late 2012. These investors advocated for Apple to 
implement a plan to return some of the company’s cash, which totaled $137 billion at the 
time, to stockholders. Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, seemed dismissive of these concerns at 
the February 2013 annual meeting. However, by April 2013 the company had declared a 
15% increase in its quarterly dividend paid to stockholders (Apple Inc., 2013). Such 
events suggest that weak relationships and a lack of two-way communication with 
investors can lead to powerful shareholder resistance. 
The CEOs interviewed also described the importance of providing as much 
information as possible to investors and that investors appreciate it when CEOs make a 
consistent effort to ensure a thorough understanding of their companies’ strategies, 
operations, and market opportunities. Given the importance of both prompt and quality 
information to investors, this finding suggests that CEOs are working to satisfy investors’ 
needs when responding and communicating meaningful information to them in a timely 
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way, which is consistent with the dimension of satisfaction, or the degree to which one 
party feels favorably toward the other as a result of positive expectations about the 
relationship being met (Hon & Grunig, 1999).  
This finding also provides evidence of the significant role communication plays 
within a relationship management framework when applied to investor relations. Despite 
the constraining effects of the regulatory requirements on a public company’s 
communication, the interviewees reported a willingness to meet with investors and to 
have an open and transparent dialogue with them about what they are working to 
accomplish as CEOs and to talk about “the story behind the numbers.” In addition, 
several interviewees discussed the need to communicate honestly and openly with 
investors in both good times and bad, emphasizing that “it is a mistake not to be 
transparent and talking” when an industry is going through a difficult time. When CEOs 
are consistently willing to proactively share information in this way, it contributes to 
investors’ overall understanding of a company as these investors make their decisions to 
buy, sell, or hold a company’s stock. Such a commitment to communication also builds 
credibility for CEOs and their companies.  
Such a two-way symmetrical approach to using communication to gain mutual 
understanding and strengthen relationships with investors is consistent with Kelly, 
Laskin, and Rosenstein’s (2010) work showing that the two-way symmetrical model is 
predominately practiced in investor relations by members of NIRI and PRSA’s Financial 
Communications Section.  
Furthermore, according to Dozier, Grunig, L. A., and Grunig, J. E. (1995), two-
way models of communication are characterized by both formal and informal ‘strategic 
68 
 
research” (p. 42) that helps organizations gather information about publics to better 
understand stakeholders’ interests and concerns. The current data confirm that the CEOs 
rely on such a two-way process as they engage with investors. The interviewees reported 
feeling a responsibility to maintain an open mind and to listen sincerely to investors from 
whom they often gain insights that might not occur to them otherwise. While 
acknowledging these discussions may not always result in a mutual agreement on the 
issue, the CEOs indicated a willingness to engage in a healthy debate with their investors, 
even if they could not always accommodate the interests of investors. This suggests that 
CEOs in the study communicate with investors not only to provide information but also 
to collect information that can improve their organizations’ strategic decision making and 
create a greater likelihood that the decisions of the CEOs and their management teams 
will align with the interests of investors when possible. By engaging with their investors 
in this way, CEOs make use of informal strategic research to expand their understanding 
of their investors and to gain feedback, thereby closing the loop between themselves and 
investors and making their communication with this key stakeholder group a two-way 
process. 
However, as the shareholders of both Apple and Dell demonstrated during 2013 
in the examples cited earlier, public companies and their investors sometimes have 
competing interests that result in serious conflicts. These competing interests can position 
the company and its investors as “cooperative antagonists” (Dozier, Grunig, L. A., & 
Grunig, J. E., 1995, p. 48) who need to find a compromise that is acceptable to both. Such 
an approach reflects a mixed-motive approach in which communication is used to create 
a win-win zone. In such an environment, the relationship between an organization and its 
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public is unsatisfactory and unstable outside of the win-win zone (Dozier, Grunig, L. A., 
& Grunig, J. E., 1995). When companies fail to build relationships characterized by such 
qualities as trust, satisfaction, control mutuality, and commitment, the mixed-motive 
approach is likely to provide the most effective means for re-establishing equilibrium to 
the relationship through a negotiated compromise. Three of the interviewees gave 
specific examples of strategic decisions they had made which displeased their investors. 
However, the CEOs believe the relationships with their investors had earned them strong 
credibility, which mitigated these investors’ concerns and helped over time to return 
equilibrium to the relationships. 
In addition to the qualities of trust, satisfaction, and control mutuality, the 
interview data confirmed commitment as a quality that characterizes the relationships 
between CEOs and their investors. Hon and Grunig (1999) describe commitment as a 
willingness to invest energy in developing and maintaining a relationship. As discussed 
earlier, the majority of the CEOs interviewed reported spending 30% of their time 
overseeing strategic direction of investor relations and communicating directly with 
investors. Recall that L.A. Grunig (1992) has suggested that public companies may be 
compelled to engage with investors as a priority stakeholder group because of the capital 
they provide. However, the interview data show that as they make decisions about their 
companies, CEOs feel a responsibility to keep in mind the interests of all of their 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, and the general public, in addition to 
investors. All of the interviewees reported they make decisions about their companies 
based on what they believe is right for the company in the long term and not just on 
feedback they receive from investors. This broader view of a company’s constituencies 
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was shared by CEOs in a survey conducted by the Arthur W. Page Society in 2013. 
According to the study, the dramatic growth of effective communication channels makes 
it necessary for companies today to pay attention to more audiences and to subgroups of 
those audiences. One CEO in the study said, “We have to be sensitive to and have an 
open line of communication to many more people than in the past” (Arthur W. Page 
Society, 2013, p. 9). 
These findings from both the current study and the Arthur W. Page Society 
suggest the common ground between investor relations and public relations may be 
expanding as public companies increasingly seek to build relationships with and balance 
the diverse interests of all of their key stakeholders. Another factor contributing to CEOs’ 
perceptions of the blurring of the boundaries between public relations and investors 
relations may be the reality that all messages have to work for all audiences all the time. 
Eventually, “everyone see and hears everything” (Arthur W. Page, 2013, p. 9). As one of 
the CEOs in the current study said, “I have a tough time trying to segment audiences in 
the world we live in.” 
When CEOs in the current study were asked what skills and professional 
characteristics they consider most important to an investor relations professional, four of 
the six CEOs indicated that being able to effectively communicate what the company is 
trying to do and what is happening within the organization is a critical skill. While a clear 
understanding of the regulatory requirements for disclosing information to investors and 
the ability to discuss financial performance are unquestionably essential to the investor 
relations professional, the majority of CEOs in the study specified without hesitation that 
effective communication skills are a necessity as well. This contradicts to some extent 
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Petersen and Martin’s (1996) finding, which reported that CEOs perceive investor 
relations to be a “highly specialized financial function and that they do not believe public 
relations practitioners can handle it” (p. 203). It also runs counter to NIRI research which 
showed an increase during 2012 in its new members with finance and/or accounting 
expertise and a decline in new members with corporate communications backgrounds. 
According to the research, 42% of new members in 2012 had finance and/or accounting 
backgrounds and 11% had corporate communications expertise. In 1990, 36% had 
finance and/or accounting expertise and 21% had expertise in corporate communications 
(Porter, 2012). Nevertheless, the current study’s finding that CEOs recognize the 
contribution of communication expertise to investor relations suggests that public 
relations professionals who have not succeeded yet in gaining the respect of the dominant 
coalition afforded investor relations professionals may become more highly regarded by 
executives in the C-Suite and given a seat at the table to participate as their investor 
relations colleagues do in senior level strategic decision making.  
Petersen and Martin (1996) also found that “CEOs often retain primary 
responsibility for this activity [investor relations] sharing it only with those executives 
most likely to understand its complexity” (p.174). Such executives are typically the CFO 
and legal counsel. The current study confirmed this finding. 
An alternative narrative emerged from the study’s data that differs in major ways 
from the perceptions and experiences reported by the majority of the interviewees. One 
CEO indicated that he has turned over the primary responsibility for managing the 
communication and relationship with his company’s investors to other members of the 
dominant coalition, chiefly the CFO and legal counsel. The other CEOs in the study 
72 
 
reported being more intimately engaged with their investors, even though their CFOs, 
legal counsel and investor relations professionals had key roles as well. Although this 
CEO indicated that earlier in his leadership role at the company he had been more 
involved with investors, he suggested during the interview that he focuses his attention 
now on building the culture of his company, which he described as his organization’s 
“greatest asset.”  
He is “always in front” of employees and tells them that although his business 
card says “CEO,” his real job is “head of support” for his employees. Such an emphasis 
on employees as a priority audience is consistent with a recommendation made by Jay 
Hooley, chairman, president and chief executive officer of State Street Corp., at a 2013 
Wall Street Journal CEO Council with leading corporate executives from a range of 
industries gathered to address some of today’s most critical economic issues. According 
to Hooley, “I think if all U.S. businesses devoted more mindshare to how to rally every 
mind in their organization around a single mission and set of values, the result would be a 
dramatically better business climate for everyone” (Wall Street Journal,  2013, November 
29, p. 3). 
This CEO suggested throughout the interview that performance is what matters 
most to his investors and that 90% of their interest is in the company’s financials. This is 
contrary to the other interviewees’ perspectives and the findings included in the literature 
review of the current study which suggest intangibles represent more than 50% of the 
criteria used today by investors for making decisions.  
The financial performance of this CEO’s company has been strong historically 
and that is the case currently as well. During the past five years, the company’s stock 
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price has nearly doubled after a sharp decline between 2007 and 2009. In addition, the 
company has been recognized on a variety of occasions – both nationally and locally – as 
an exemplary business organization. In general, this company seems to be evidence of the 
business philosophy that if companies “get it right with customers, employees, reputation 
– then shareholders win. If they get it wrong, they lose” (Garten, 2001, p. 167). 
An alternative narrative such as the one described above challenges the findings 
of the current study and calls for further investigation. Clearly, creating value for 
shareholders constitutes the major responsibility for CEOs of public companies, and it is 
the criteria by which they are measured. The issue is not whether they deliver value for 
their shareholders but how and over what time frame that goal is achieved (Garten, 2001). 
Some explanation for this CEO’s perspective may be found in examining organizations 
and their outcomes as a reflection of top executives and the values and thought processes 
that guide their decision making (Hambrick & Mason, 1986). 
Implications for Practice and Future Research 
While investor relations officers who are highly skilled in communication, 
finance, and securities law compliance provide the day-to-day leadership at the heart of a 
proactive and professional investor relations program, the organization’s CEO is the 
individual who investors ultimately hold accountable for a public company’s 
performance. Also, according to the 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer, “With regard to 
business, trust in the person leading the company is inextricably linked with trust in the 
company itself. Actions taken by CEOs shape trust in the companies they lead and 
influence the behaviors and attitudes of their stakeholders” (Edelman, 2014). For such 
reasons, examining both CEOs’ experiences and their perspectives about the 
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communication and relationship building processes with investors advances the 
knowledge of investor relations while expanding the understanding of the relevance of 
relationship management as an established theory in public relations to investor relations. 
Significantly, this study is the first investigation of relationship management as a theory 
applicable to investor relations. In addition, it is the only study in the field of public 
relations to examine CEOs perceptions and experiences since the Petersen and Marten 
study (1996). 
For the practice of investor relations, the study has several implications. The 
substantial amount of time CEOs spend engaging with investors is evidence of the 
continued importance of this stakeholder group for public companies. Nevertheless, the 
findings suggest that CEOs of public companies increasingly recognize the need to take 
into account and balance the interests of a broader base of stakeholders. Succeeding in 
this effort requires the knowledge of advanced communication practices and represents 
an opportunity for public relations professionals to demonstrate the strategic value of 
their expertise to the dominant coalition and gain the respect these executives give to 
investor relations. 
Similarly, given the strong influence intangibles have on investors’ decision 
making, the findings suggest CEOs are likely to pay increased attention to managing 
corporate reputation and articulating their organizations’ stories in a transparent and 
authentic way that goes well beyond financial performance. Doing so requires the 
reputation management expertise and sophisticated messaging skills of the top 
communicators in their organizations. This creates an additional opportunity for public 
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relations professionals to demonstrate their value as strategic counselors to the dominant 
coalition of public companies. 
While recognizing that some blurring of the boundaries between investor relations 
and public relations is underway as both professions continue to evolve, public relations 
practitioners also need to recognize that some key differences exist in the professional 
expertise required to lead best practice investor relations programs. Achieving 
professional credibility in investor relations requires that public relations professionals 
access training through professional organizations such as NIRI and the Financial 
Communications Section of PRSA as well as academic institutions to expand their 
knowledge and develop expertise in the skills specific to investor relations, including 
securities law compliance and finance.  
In particular, the overarching impact that the regulatory requirements have on 
public company communication as evidenced by this study underscores the need for 
educators to include securities law compliance in curriculum designed to prepare students 
to specialize in investor relations, because investor relations professionals play a key role 
in managing along with CEOs and their leadership teams, the disclosure of information to 
investors. Also, the trend in NIRI’s membership (Porter, 2012) toward professionals with 
finance expertise underscores the importance of including financial analysis and 
accounting in investor relations curriculum. Overall, because few colleges and 
universities offer investor relations curriculum there exists an opportunity for educators 
to collaborate across the disciplines of communication, securities law and finance to 
develop an interdisciplinary approach to investor relations education. Such an approach 
would effectively prepare students with the diverse skills needed to lead investor relations 
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programs in today’s world of globalized financial markets where digital communication 
makes 24/7 information available to an increasingly broad base of stakeholders. These 
stakeholders are likely to consider intangibles equal to or more important than financial 
performance.  
  This study and others suggest that successful relationships can create value for a 
public company by the impact they have on investors’ buy or sell decisions. Informed by 
such research, investor relations professionals can borrow from proven public relations 
practices and increase their effectiveness by building programs around relationship goals 
with communication strategies designed to facilitate goal achievement. Such an 
orientation to investor relations, for example, would support the desired outcome as 
articulated by CEOs in this study of attracting and maintaining relationships with long-
term investors. 
With regard to future research, investigating a larger sample by surveying CEOs 
in diverse industries and across broader market capitalization categories would make it 
possible to use quantitative analysis to identify more fully the qualities that characterize 
CEO-investor relationships that then could be generalized to the broader population of 
CEOs in public companies. Additionally, research using the lens of relationship 
management to examine the experiences and perspectives of other members of the 
dominant coalition, including CFOs and in-house legal counsel, as well as key publics in 
the investment community, including institutional investors and buy and sell-side 
analysts, is needed to establish the relevance of this theory to investor relations.  
Additional research also is needed to more fully examine the relationship 
dimensions identified by Hon and Grunig (1999) and to investigate other dimensions that 
77 
 
may be specific to the relationships between public companies and their investors such as 
authenticity and proactivity. 
The blurring of the boundaries between investor relations and public relations 
creates an opportunity for public relations scholars to investigate further both the 
similarities and differences between the two disciplines. Such knowledge would advance 
the understanding of the expanding common ground between public relations and 
investor relations and provide a framework for closer collaboration among practitioners 
in the two fields. However, the continued lack of awareness of the strategic role of public 
relations among senior executives who view its primary function as tactical will impede 
efforts to increase the integration and collaboration between the two disciplines.  
Based on the findings of this study, the seemingly interdependent role in investor 
relations of the mixed-motive model, two-way communication, and relationship 
management theory needs to be investigated further. The regulatory requirements of the 
SEC and the stock exchanges make communication particularly risky for the dominant 
coalitions of publicly traded companies. However, investors’ strong need for reliable 
information and their ability to affect a company’s market valuation motivates CEOs to 
find a win-win zone. Getting to a win-win zone requires that CEOs of public companies 
walk a tightrope by communicating openly and honestly with their investors without 
creating litigation risk by violating regulatory requirements.  
To the extent that CEOs successfully navigate this tightrope with investors, they 
develop credibility and earn the trust of these key stakeholders who then demonstrate a 
greater willingness to be long-term investors – which creates mutual benefit for both the 
organization and its investors as well as other stakeholders. If CEOs fail to navigate this 
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tightrope effectively, their relationships with investors are likely, at the very least, to be 
contentious, as exemplified by Tim Cook at Apple and Michael Dell in 2013, or costly, if 
investors choose to exit the relationship altogether by selling a company’s stock. 
The findings of the current study suggest that investor relations may, at various 
times, rely upon the mixed-motive model, relationship management theory, and two-way 
communication, depending on internal and external factors, such as the organizational 
structure, company’s financial condition, CEO leadership style, industry performance, 
and economic climate.  Such an approach makes it possible to engage with investors in a 
way that minimizes the risk for the dominant coalition of violating regulatory 
requirements, including REG FD, while maximizing the opportunity to satisfy investors’ 
need for reliable information and a trustworthy relationship with the CEO and other 
company officials. Because this study focused on relationship management theory, 
further research is needed to examine the interplay of these theoretical frameworks within 
investor relations. 
In addition, given the weight of CEOs words among investors and the importance 
to CEOs of being effective communicators as they engage with their investors, analyzing 
CEO statements at annual meetings, in shareholder letters, earnings news releases, and 
webcasts with investors from a rhetorical theory perspective would reveal how these 
communications either strengthen or weaken relationships with investors, particularly 
activist investors. 
In conclusion, investor relations is a young discipline that only recently has begun 
to receive the attention of public relations scholars. This exploratory study has 
contributed to relationship management theory by providing data that show CEOs believe 
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relationship to be at the heart of investor relations. These same CEOs perceive public 
relations to be about generating media coverage – a journalist-in-residence function. This 
suggests that investor relations is putting relationship management theory into practice 
while public relations continues to be defined as gaining publicity. 
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APPENDIX A 
CODES RELATED TO QUALITIES THAT DEFINE THE RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN CEOS AND THEIR MAJOR INVESTORS 
 
Classifications Category  Description 
Open code 
Constant challenge to manage 
relationship 
CEOs feel  constrained in 
relationships with investors 
Properties Tough 
Strong incentives due to 
regulatory requirements (Reg 
FD) to limit deep personal 
relationships with investors 
  
Consistently discipline myself 
(CEO) 
Not easy 
  Play it straight Stay on message 
  
Give everybody a level playing 
field 
Need to be responsive to all 
investors  -- good, bad and ugly 
  No email messages 
Always a second person in the 
discussion 
Open code 
As they make investment 
decisions, investors need to 
believe CEO is trustworthy 
Trust is absolutely critical to the 
relationship between the CEO 
and investors 
Properties 
Investors don’t make an 
investment from a distance, 
from just going to a 
conference, from online 
information 
Serious investors want to meet 
with and have a dialogue with 
CEO 
  
Doing what you say you’re 
going to do develops trust  
What CEO says needs to stand 
the test of time 
Axial code 
Regulatory requirements limit 
the nature of the relationships 
CEOs engage in with investors 
CEO face unique challenges, 
including regulatory constraints, 
in their effort to build trustworthy 
relationships with investors 
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Classifications Category Description 
Open code Investors want access to quality 
information 
CEOs need to lay out exactly 
what they're trying to accomplish 
Properties Investors can access numbers 
online in the 10K and 10Q 
It’s the story investors are 
interested in 
  Talk about what’s behind the 
numbers 
Be transparent 
  Don’t misled or flower things up Be realistic (not overly 
enthusiastic) 
  Engage with investors as if they 
were customers 
Investors are customers; they’re 
just buying the stock as opposed 
to a product 
  Return phone calls quickly Be prompt in responding 
Open code Investors will be disappointed 
when companies face the 
inevitable challenges of 
operating businesses in dynamic 
marketplaces 
When companies go through 
tough times, CEOs need to 
communicate more and be more 
available to investors 
Properties Don’t pull covers over your 
head 
Keep talking 
  Don’t try to avoid it Acknowledge it; don’t sugarcoat 
it 
  Go to more Wall Street 
conferences 
Can never provide too much 
information 
  Hold more one-on-one meetings 
with investors 
Be open 
  Do lengthier conference calls Be as accessible as possible 
  Anticipate the questions Let the questions come 
Axial code CEOs need to engage with 
investors honestly and openly in 
good times and bad 
Access to timely, balanced and 
quality information is necessary 
for investors to understand what 
CEOs are trying to accomplish 
and the story behind the numbers 
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Classifications Category Description 
Open code 
Investors’ opinions are taken 
seriously for the most part 
Investors’  comments can 
create focus that a CEO hadn’t 
thought about or had 
undervalued 
Properties 
Investors’ comments can be 
clarifying 
CEOs benefit from investors’ 
insights 
  
Themes can emerge from 
discussions with investors 
CEO get valuable feedback 
from investors 
  
Not all comments/opinions are  
taken seriously, if they are 
based on short-term returns 
rather than the long-term health 
of the company 
CEOs need to have an open 
mind about investors’ 
perspectives and engage in an 
honest dialogue  
  
CEOs have a responsibility to 
listen sincerely to investors’ 
views on key initiatives 
The legitimacy of input varies 
from investor to investor 
Open code 
CEOs want to their spend time 
with investors who take a long-
term view and will be long-term 
investors (three to five years or 
more) 
CEOs prefer long-term 
investors to investors focused 
on what’s going to happen in 
next few weeks or months 
Properties 
Long-term investors ask a lot of 
questions 
Long-term investors study the 
company deeply 
  
Long-term investors study the 
team and the strategy 
Long-term investors are 
deliberate 
  
Short-term investors want to 
know what might drive the 
stock up or down over next few 
weeks  or months 
Short-term investors are 
interested in near-term catalysts 
Axial code 
CEOs feel a responsibility to 
listen to investors who often 
provide valuable insights 
CEOs value investors’ 
feedback and want to focus 
their time on investors who are 
deeply interested in the 
company and who are 
comfortable being long-term 
investors 
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Classifications Category  Description 
Open code 
CEOs can reach out to 
investors and make it clear 
who the company is, but 
investors judge whether to 
invest or not 
Investors form their judgments 
based on what they hear the 
CEO say and what they see the 
CEO do 
Properties 
Investors’ principal goal is 
making money 
Investors measure company 
based on quarterly and annual 
financial returns 
  
Investors’ will sell if 
fundamentals change 
Investors will sell if facts 
prove CEO wrong 
  
Investors will sell if 
competitive position changes   
  
Investors will tolerate surprises 
only if they continue to trust 
the CEO   
Open code 
CEOs make decisions about 
their companies based not just 
on what investors think but on 
what is right for the company 
overall 
CEOs are not going to change 
strategies to satisfy investors, 
unless they believe it is good 
for the company 
Properties 
Credibility helps mitigate 
investors’ concerns about 
CEOs passing up certain 
opportunities 
No one understands the 
company better than the 
company 
  
CEOs are trying to do what is 
right for employees, 
customers, as well as investors 
CEOs have numerous 
constituencies to think about 
as they make decisions 
Axial code 
CEOs have multiple audiences, 
in addition to investors, to 
consider when making 
decisions  
CEOs make decisions about 
the company based on what 
they believe is right for the 
company in the long term and 
not just on feedback from 
investors 
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Classifications Category Description 
Open code 
Investors look not only at 
numbers but also at whether 
they trust management to hit 
those numbers 
Intangibles are key to investors’ 
decision making 
Properties 
Investors want to see leadership 
teams that are trustworthy 
Leadership needs to be honest 
  
Leadership needs to constantly 
do the right thing 
Investors expect CEOs to act 
with integrity 
  
Leadership needs to be 
personally invested in the future 
(of the company) themselves 
Leadership needs to work hard 
  
Leadership needs to be 
balanced; not so enthusiastic 
that they don’t see reality 
Investors want leadership to be 
discriminating, grounded, 
thorough and tough 
Open code 
CEOs demonstrate commitment 
to their investors by making sure 
investors understand the 
company 
Providing a consistent level of 
effort, engagement, and 
messaging demonstrates CEOs 
understand investors’ needs 
Properties 
Establishing a level of rapport 
with investors gains credibility 
and respect for CEOs 
CEOs develop credibility and 
respect with investors by 
building relationships with them 
  
Investors demonstrate their 
satisfaction by increasing or 
decreasing their stock ownership 
positions in a company 
Investors’ satisfaction is 
evidenced by their willingness 
to own the company’s stock 
  
Investors expect CEOs to 
deliver strong results based on 
understanding the true levers of 
the business 
Improving performance is one 
way CEOs demonstrate a 
commitment to investors 
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Classifications Category  Description 
Axial code 
Investors rely on intangibles to 
determine if CEOs can deliver 
results 
Investors make investment 
decisions based on whether or not 
they trust CEOs’ ability to deliver 
strong performance 
Open code 
Public relations looks at the 
company’s overall image and its 
products 
Public relations is more broad than 
investor relations 
Properties 
Public relations is sometimes 
harder than investor relations 
The media is only interested if you 
are trendy or in a hot area 
  
The media is motivated by what 
will sell newspapers or draw 
viewers 
The media tend to dramatize the 
present 
  The media tend to be sensational 
What the media write or say 
doesn’t have to stand the test of 
time 
Open Code 
Public relations and investor 
relations share the challenge of 
communicating with third parties, 
but they are different beasts 
Investor relations speaks to a more 
targeted audience about financial 
performance and how it will be 
achieved 
Properties 
Investors are motivated to make 
money, so they listen to CEOs 
communicate about their 
companies 
Investor have an inherent interest 
in at least hearing what CEOs have 
to say 
  
Employees, customers, and 
citizens of local community can all 
be investors, so the messages have 
to be the same to all audiences 
Messages to employees, 
customers, investors and local 
community have to be consistent 
  
The common measurement of a 
public company among 
employees, customers, investors, 
and local community is the stock 
price 
Each of a public company’s 
audiences care about how the 
company’s stock price is doing 
  
Public relations professionals need 
to understand how the company is 
doing financially 
Public relations and investor 
relations have to reflect the same 
tone and key messages 
  
Both public relations and investor 
relations require the ability to 
listen and explain things with 
patience while also being timely, 
proactive and responsive 
Both public relations and investor 
relations professionals need to 
have the ability to manage 
interpersonal relationships 
Axial code 
Investor relations and public 
relations share some common 
ground 
The lines are blurring between 
investor relations and public 
relations 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW GUIDE  
1 How satisfied are you with the relationships that you have with your major 
investors? Please explain why you are satisfied or not. 
 In what ways have your major investors shown that they are satisfied 
with their relationships with your company?  In what ways have they 
shown any dissatisfaction?  Please provide specific examples. 
 
2 How important is trust in your relationships with your investors? Please explain. 
 How do you go about building trust with your investors? Please 
provide specific examples. 
 
3 What is your response to the following statement: Whenever my organization 
makes an important decision, the investment community knows that I will make a 
reasonable effort to take its concerns into consideration. 
 How legitimate do you believe investors’ opinions of your company 
are?  Please explain. 
 
4 Tell me about a time you have taken into account your major investors in 
decisions you’ve made or an action you’ve taken. Please provide specific 
examples. 
 To what extent do you feel you have any control over what your 
investors do that affects you and your company? Why or why not? 
 Tell me how you and your company work to maintain a constructive 
relationship with your major investors. Please provide specific 
examples. 
 How do you demonstrate to your investors that you are interested in 
maintaining an ongoing relationship with them? 
 In what ways do you and your investors benefit mutually from your 
relationship?  Please explain. 
 
5 How important do you think nonfinancial indicators/intangibles are to investors’ 
assessment of the companies in which they invest? 
6 What professional skills and characteristics do you consider most important for 
the individual/individuals leading your investor relations program? 
 
7 Describe your involvement as CEO in your company’s investor relations 
program. Approximately how much time do you spend each quarter engaged in 
investor relations activities, including overseeing strategic direction and 
communicating directly with investors? 
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8 What do you believe are the most important achievements of an effective investor 
relations program? 
 
9 Do you believe any common ground exists between investor relations and public 
relations? Why or why not? 
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